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2Abstract 
Objectives
1. To observe the level of correspondence between problems identified by GPs in the 
referral letter, and primary treatment targets identified by Clinical Psychologists 
following assessment within an NHS Clinical Psychology Department.
2. To examine whether the pattern of correspondence between GP and Psychologist 
varies for different psychological problem areas.
3. To highlight problems with the current department referral auditing system.
Design
A retrospective review, and classification, of GP referral letters and Psychologist 
treatment targets.
Setting
A Department of Clinical Psychology based in Scotland. Sixty five GPs based across 
fifteen GP practices refer to the department.
Cases
Four hundred and one patients consecutively referred to the Department of Clinical 
Psychology between April 1 1996 and March 31 1998, and subsequently assessed by 
one of the qualified Clinical Psychologists. Two hundred and seventy three cases were 
female (68.08%), one hundred and twenty eight male (31.92%).
Results
Overall agreement between GP referred problem and Psychologist treatment target, 
coded in terms of EPPIC 'reasons for care' categories was 'fair', and observed for
359.60% of cases. High agreement for eating disorders, moderate agreement for 
anxiety and depression and low agreement for relationship/social problems was 
observed. Analysis suggested GP over-referral of anxiety and depression. A number 
of problems with existing departmental auditing of referrals were also highlighted.
Conclusions
Findings appear to replicate those in the literature regarding over-referral of anxiety 
and depression. Low levels of agreement for relationship/social problems were not 
anticipated. The implications of results for future research and service provision are 
outlined.
4Introduction
The quality of care received by patients within the NHS relies, in part, on good 
communication between General Practitioners (GPs) and clinical specialists (1). 
Accordingly, an important issue within the primary care setting is the quality of 
communication between GPs and hospital specialists. Recently, researchers have 
begun to examine two related aspects of GP-specialist communication: referral content 
and referral accuracy.
A number of studies have examined the informational content of referrals sent 
between GPs and Psychiatrists (1,2,3,4). However, recently, the issue of diagnostic 
agreement between GPs and Psychiatrists has also received attention in the literature 
(5). GPs provisional diagnoses for 209 referrals to an old age psychiatry service were 
recorded and compared to diagnoses made by a psychiatrist. Subsequent analysis 
noted diagnostic correspondence on 81.9% of cases. Notably, GPs misdiagnosed a 
substantial number of depressive illnesses as anxiety disorders or other functional 
illnesses. This parallels findings from other research indicating that GPs frequently 
misinterpret psychiatric symptoms in their patients (6).
A number of related studies in the literature have suggested that GPs often fail 
to recognise or diagnose mental health problems. For example, in a recent survey (7) 
detection rates for mental health problems were found to be considerably higher when 
screening was based on the General Health Questionnaire-28 (33.2 %) and the 
Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Psychiatry (SCAN) system (31.5%), than when 
screening involved direct GP observation (14.1%). Similar results were reported in a 
study (8) where trained medical students presented to GPs suffering from generalised 
anxiety disorder. Analysis indicated that 25 of 42 GPs studied made no diagnosis at 
all, or diagnosed only physical problems. Other studies have demonstrated that GPs 
may have difficulties recognising and diagnosing depression (9).
5Despite receiving such attention in the psychiatric literature, the notion of GP 
referral accuracy has been largely ignored in the clinical psychology literature. This is 
somewhat surprising, particularly given the fact that GPs are the most frequent referral 
pathway to adult mental health psychology services (10). However, data from two 
studies are of some relevance.
In one, a Clinical Psychologist sat in on 366 GP consultations, rating each for 
psychological relevance (11). Researchers then compared these data with ratings of 
psychological relevance made by the GP for the same cases. Results indicated low 
levels of agreement between GP and Psychologist as to which cases required 
psychological input.
In a second recent study (12), 115 GP referral letters to a Clinical Psychologist 
were examined for referral problem and compared to diagnoses based on ICD-10 
criterion made by the clinician for the same cases. Results indicated agreement 
between GP and Psychologist in 56.52% of cases surveyed. Nearly half of all cases 
referred by the GP for anxiety were diagnosed differently by the psychologist, most 
frequently depression. In addition, two thirds of cases diagnosed by the psychologist 
with relationship problems were initially referred with a different problem. However, 
these data were generated from an audit of one Clinical Psychologist, and therefore 
reflect the views of a small number of GPs and one Psychologist. A broader survey of 
GP-Psychologist correspondence would clearly be useful (12).
In addition, it is important to note that the above study examined GP referrals 
and compared these to a Psychologists diagnoses. Whilst Psychologists in primary 
care may diagnose specific disorders, current models of clinical psychology delivery 
emphasise formulation and the development of treatment targets as processes central in 
the clinical management of cases (13). Thus, observation of the correspondence 
between GP referrals and Psychologists treatment targets would provide a more direct
6comparison of what patients are referred for and how they are subsequently managed.
Currently, details of all new GPs referrals to the NHS Department of Clinical 
Psychology under study are placed on an audit sheet (see Appendix 1.2). Included in 
this information are treatment targets and type of disorder, both recorded by the 
Psychologist following completion of the intervention. Discussions between the 
auditor and clinicians in the department concluded that the recording system with 
regard to treatment target was comprehensive and reliable, although some concerns 
were raised with respect to the type of disorder section. It was agreed the present audit 
would provide a useful forum for reviewing methods for recording disorder type. 
Importantly though, by examining correspondence between GP referral and treatment 
target, the present data were entirely unaffected by any limitations of the type of 
disorder recording system.
The present study therefore aimed to survey the correspondence between 
problems referred by the GP and problems subsequently targeted for treatment 
following assessment by the Psychologist. In doing so, it was anticipated that it would 
both complement, and extend, findings in the literature with respect to communication 
between General Practitioners and clinical specialists.
Method
Design
The present study was designed to provide a review of the concordance 
between referred problem and primary treatment target identified by the Psychologist 
following assessment. All patients referred by GPs to the Department of Clinical 
Psychology between April 1 1996- March 31 1998 were retrospectively included in the 
study.
In order to achieve a working degree of uniformity, problems referred (GP) and
7problems targeted for treatment (Psychologist) were each coded according to Effective 
Purchasing and Providing in the Community (EPPIC; 14) 'reason for care' categories 
(see Appendix 1.3). These categories encompass the most common psychological 
problems, and thereby provide a reasonable working definition of psychological 
dysfunction. Two additional categories derived from the EPPIC 'contributory factors' 
categories were also included in the adopted coding system: abuse/trauma and 
psychiatric illness. EPPIC contributory factors were developed to complement 
'reasons for care' categories by clarifying precisely what psychological interventions 
are targeted at (14).
In order to ensure reliability of coding, the system of allocation to EPPIC 
categories was subjected to a test of inter-rater reliability. A random sample of 20% (n 
= 80) of all problems referred and problems targeted were allocated to the same set of 
modified EPPIC categories as those utilised by the auditor. A Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist completed this procedure in order to control for any bias due to 
differential level of experience.
Obtained data indicated a high degree of inter-rater agreement overall 
(89.38%), as is evident in Table 1.1.
Insert Table 1.1 here
Kappa Coefficient analysis confirmed a high degree of inter-rater reliability, indicating 
this was ’excellent' (15) for both problems referred (K = 0.73) and problems targeted 
(K = 0.98).
Procedure
Data collection consisted of two phases. First, the referral letters of all cases 
were examined, and a primary reason for referral identified, and coded using the
8modified EPPIC categories. Direct reference to a particular problem (e.g. he is now at 
the stage he is clinically depressed.), but also an accurate behavioural description of 
symptoms (e.g. she is low in mood, weepy, her sleep pattern is disturbed, she is 
negative in her thinking and she shows reduction in appetite and concentration.), led to 
final categorisation. When more than one presenting problem was described, the 
problem which most closely reflected the GPs treatment priority was encoded as 
primary. An unstated category was relied upon for those letters where no problem was 
apparent. This occurred on only 11 (0.03%) of all cases.
Secondly, the primary target problem for each case, identified following 
assessment by the Psychologist was coded according to the modified EPPIC 
categories. Obtained data were then subjected to descriptive and inferential analysis.
Discussion sessions were also held with the departmental psychologists to 
highlight and clarify any potential problems with the departmental audit sheet structure 
and content.
Results
1. Overall Correspondence Levels
Analysis indicated there was agreement between problem referred and problem 
targeted on 239 of 401 cases, a correspondence level of 59.60%. This equates to 
agreement between GP and Psychologist on three fifths of cases. Obtained data were 
subjected to a test of inter-rater reliability using Kappa Coefficients. This 
demonstrated agreement levels were fair (K = 0.46; cf. 15).
Insert Table 1.2 here
2. The Distribution o f Correspondence levels across EPPIC categories
Table 1.2 delineates the relationship between problem referred and problem
9targeted. The shaded area denotes correspondence. Percentage agreement levels for 
each problem area were also computed and are displayed in Figure 1.1. The equation 
and workings used to calculate these data is displayed in Appendix 1.4. Note that the 
frequency of cases in each category was not equal.
Highest agreement was seen for eating disorders (68.42%) and for 
abuse/trauma (60.00%). Moderate agreement was seen for anxiety disorders 
(54.08%), with one third of referred cases treated for a different problem. Agreement 
was lower for depression (42.45%), with half of depression referrals treated 
differently. Agreement was very low for relationship/social problems (21.33%), with 
half of cases referred for relationship/social difficulties treated differently. Moreover, 
two thirds of cases treated for relationship/social difficulties were referred with a 
different problem.
There was no agreement for Personality Disorder, Psychiatric Illness and 
Addictions, although the frequency of cases allocated to these categories was low 
(<5).
Insert Figure 1.1 here
3. Referral Letter Content
During examination of referral letters, themes were recorded and categorised. 
A very small number of these were relevant to the issue of discrepancies between GPs 
and Psychologists. In seven instances, GPs alluded to the notion that patients had 
"underlying problems which they are not able to discuss". In a further two, GPs 
referred for one problem but noted that input in other areas might be more relevant: "I 
wonder whether this patient requires input in a different area".
A number of other unrelated themes emerged. There were sixteen instances of 
the use of "urgent/soon". In twenty seven letters, the GP noted the patient would
10
"benefit from psychological counselling", whilst in eight cases, the GP noted that "the 
patient feels they would benefit from psychological input". In a further twenty letters., 
GPs wrote that the patient was "keen/motivated to make changes".
Discussion
The present study aimed to extend previous findings regarding psychological 
problems identified and referred by GPs, and those subsequently targeted for treatment 
by Clinical Psychologists. This was achieved by examining the rate of concordance 
between primary referred problem (GP) and primary treatment target (Clinical 
Psychologist) across 401 consecutive GP referrals to a Clinical Psychology 
Department. A secondary aim was to highlight any shortcomings with departmental 
recording of new referrals. Both these aims were broadly achieved.
Overall agreement was fair (15) and observed for 59.60% of cases. Analysis 
across problem categories suggested high agreement for eating disorders, moderate 
agreement for anxiety and depression, and low agreement for relationship/social 
problems. In addition, a number of problems with departmental audit sheet procedures 
(type of disorder, outcome scale, opt-in details) were usefully detected.
Overall agreement levels were lower than that seen in the psychiatric literature 
(5), although this may be because the present study examined referrals from GPs to 
Psychologists, rather than from GPs to Psychiatrists. GPs and Psychiatrists share an 
initially generic medical training and may rely on similar approaches (e.g. ICD-10 or 
DSM-IV) to conceptualise and categorise mental health problems. Moreover, the 
present study examined agreement between referral and treatment targets rather than 
referral and diagnosis. Psychologists may agree with a diagnosis of a particular 
problem (e.g. depression), but choose to initially target a specific aspect of the problem 
(e.g. sleep problem).
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A number of other factors may have contributed to observed disagreement 
levels. As noted, GPs may diagnose and refer for depression which, whilst central to a 
Psychologists formulation, may not in itself become a key target for treatment. In 
addition, GPs see patients for short consultation times, commonly 6 minutes (16), and 
must decide on psychological problems based on limited information. Moreover, 
given such time limits, patients may themselves be unwilling, or unable, to disclose 
details regarding their personal problems during GP consultations. GPs and Clinical 
Psychologists experience different training backgrounds and may utilise different 
assessment approaches. GPs are guided by categorical classification systems whereas 
Psychologists more often rely on a hypothesis driven, semi-structured interview 
procedure aimed at developing a case formulation. Again, this may result in the 
identification of treatment targets quite different to an initial diagnosis. Finally, 
referral to a specialist service, in this case clinical psychology, necessitates a greater 
level of detail reported by the patient. In sum, therefore, some disagreement between 
GP referral and Psychologists treatment targets is quite likely, as previous research has 
suggested (11,12).
Despite some of the above factors, agreement for certain problem areas was 
high e.g. eating disorders. All but one of the cases referred for an eating disorder 
subsequently received treatment for this following assessment. This is perhaps not 
surprising. Physical and psychological symptoms of eating disorders are specific and 
tangible (e.g. weight loss, fear of fatness, distorted body image). Such symptoms are 
therefore more easily observed. A relatively high level of agreement was also seen for 
the category of abuse/trauma. This may reflect GPs awareness of their patients history 
and personal background as part of the doctor patient relationship.
Analysis indicated moderate agreement for anxiety, with one third of anxiety 
referrals subsequently treated for a different problem, most frequently depression or
12
relationship/social difficulties. This might be consistent with GP over-referral of 
anxiety (5,6,12), and may be the result of patients reporting secondary anxiety 
symptoms caused by an underlying primary problem. The present data appear to 
suggest this may be occurring with respect to relationship difficulties, PTSD, anger 
and addictions (see Table 1.2). Similarly, approximately half of depression referrals 
were treated differently following psychological assessment. This also appears 
consistent with previous findings (e.g. 6,9), and again may be the result of GPs 
labelling effect (depression) rather than cause (e.g. relationship difficulties).
Finally, analysis indicated that approximately two thirds of cases treated for 
relationship/social difficulties were initially referred with a different problem. This 
may relate to different training backgrounds, with GPs more likely to diagnose a 
medical problem, rather than underlying relationship difficulties. It may also reflect 
the difficulties of disentangling whether a relationship difficulty is causing a patients 
symptoms, or vice versa. It is also possible that whilst a patient may have met GP 
criterion for depression, formulation led the Psychologists to treat underlying 
dysfunctional relationships hypothesised as exacerbating the problem. This may 
reflect the orientation of a particular Psychologist e.g. a psychodynamic focus on 
relationships. Further research is required to clarify these issues.
Completion of the present study demonstrated a clear need to improve 
departmental recording of patient diagnoses. The system utilised at the time of audit 
presented clinicians with a limited choice of only six disorder types, not representative 
of DSM-IV categories. Discussions with departmental psychologists confirmed this, 
and as a result, the "type of disorder" list has recently been extended to cover DSM-IV 
categories. This may facilitate more accurate recording of patient diagnoses, and 
allow for more accurate comparisons of levels of correspondence between referred 
problem, psychologist diagnosis and psychologist treatment target. Discussions also
13
highlighted problems with the audit outcome scale (1-5 of improvement) and opt-in 
information. Changes to recording procedures have been suggested by the auditor, 
and are to be implemented in the near future.
Further studies examining concordance between GP and Psychologist could 
also be conducted in a larger department or across a number of departments. This 
would overcome the limitations of assessing the views of a small group of GPs and 
Psychologists, as seen in the present study. Further studies may also benefit from 
examining concordance between treatment targets and secondary/tertiary diagnoses. 
Many cases currently referred are complex and comprise more than one problem. 
Therefore, by examining only the primary referred problem, the present data may omit 
valuable information. In addition, the present study did not examine the influence of 
time spent on the waiting list, on subsequent agreement levels between GP and 
Psychologist. Greater agreement might have been observed at a short waiting time, 
although analysis of this was beyond the scope of the present study. Finally, in the 
present study, agreement levels across individual GPs were not calculated. Thus, 
perhaps one or two outliers in the data have distorted findings. Future research could 
attempt to control for the influence of such extreme data points.
Despite such limitations, the present study appears to replicate findings in the 
literature regarding the differential treatment by Psychologists of some cases initially 
referred by GPs for anxiety and depression (5,6,9,12). In addition, by examining 
correspondence between referral and treatment target, it arguably offers a more direct 
examination of correspondence between what patients are referred with and how they 
are subsequently managed. It also outlined some improvements with respect to 
departmental recording of patient type of disorder, although as noted, these changes 
did not influence the treatment target data set in any way. Overall agreement levels 
were encouraging, although low agreement on certain categories (e.g.
14
relationship/social problems) probably indicates the need for some changes in referral 
practices at a local level. For instance, it might be useful to offer more detailed 
information to GPs relevant to the broad domain of problem areas Psychologists work 
in. As a result of the present study, these proposed changes are currently under 
review, and the effects of these changes could be monitored using future departmental 
audit.
15
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Problem referred (GP) 80.00 %
Problem targeted (Psychologist) 98.75%
Mean concordance 89.38%
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Abstract
A review of the paradoxical intention literature with respect to initial insomnia is 
presented. Initially, evidence for the role of pre-sleep cognitions in initial insomnia is 
reviewed. Cognitive approaches to insomnia management are then outlined, and 
paradoxical intention is defined. The performance anxiety model of paradoxical intention 
is delineated, and the need to clarify this model, empirically, is emphasised. Findings 
demonstrating the efficacy of paradoxical intention are described, although evidence for 
some response variability, and the lack of studies employing objective sleep measures, is 
noted. The need for further research clarifying putative mechanisms and response 
variability, using both objective and subjective sleep measures, is therefore stressed, and 
the clinical implications of this research discussed.
Key words: Initial Insomnia, Paradoxical Intention, Performance Anxiety
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Introduction
Chronic insomnia is a widespread disorder affecting 9-12% of the general 
population (Bixler, Kales, Soldatos, Kales & Healy, 1979; Gallup Organisation, 1991; 
Mellinger, Balter & Uhlenhuth, 1985), which is characterised by dissatisfaction with 
sleep duration, efficiency and/or quality (American Sleep Disorders Association, 1997).
It is associated with both daytime fatigue, impaired performance, poor physical health and 
reduced quality of life, and is also a known risk factor for major depressive disorder 
(Breslau, Roth, Rosenthal & Andreski, 1996; Buysse, Reynolds, Kupfer, Thorpy, Bixler, 
Manfredi et al, 1994; Ford & Kamerow, 1989; Roth & Ancoli-Israel, 1999). Insomnia is 
a heterogeneous condition which encompasses a variety of forms. For example, 
sufferers may experience difficulty initiating sleep, difficulty remaining asleep, or they 
may awaken too early. The present review focuses on initial or sleep-onset insomnia i.e.
difficulty initiating sleep.
Despite its prevalence, the precise mechanisms underlying initial insomnia remain 
only partially understood (Wicklow & Espie, 2000). This is problematic, particularly 
given the contraindication of long term pharmacological approaches managing the 
condition (NIMH, 1984). However, recent research suggests that pre-sleep cognitive 
activity may mediate the development and maintenance of initial insomnia (e.g. Espie & 
Wicklow, 2001; Harvey, 2000 a,b). The present paper will review this work, and then 
examine findings regarding paradoxical intention, a cognitive technique used to treat the 
condition (e.g. Ascher & Turner, 1979). Suggestions for future research exploring 
paradoxical intention will also be made.
Initial insomnia and pre-sleep cognitive activity
Recently, evidence has converged supporting a cognitive arousal model of initial 
insomnia aetiology (Espie & Wicklow, 2001). This proposes that, rather than
24
physiological hyperarousal (cf. Monroe, 1967), pre-sleep cognitions may be central in 
the development and maintenance of the disorder. Data supporting this hypothesis has 
been generated from a number of sources.
Several reports indicate that insomniacs consistently attribute poor sleep to 
cognitive factors. For example, in their survey of 296 self defined initial insomniacs, 
Lichstein & Rosenthal (1980) found that cognitive arousal was blamed 10 times more 
frequently than physiological arousal as the central determinant of sleep difficulty. 55% 
of insomniacs attributed their disturbed sleep to cognitive arousal, whereas only 5% 
attributed it to somatic arousal. Consistent with this, both Espie, Brooks & Lindsay 
(1989) and Harvey (2000a) noted that cognitive items in the Sleep Disturbance 
Questionnaire (SDQ; e.g. 'My mind keeps turning things over') were most frequently 
endorsed by initial insomniacs in accounting for their sleeping difficulties.
There is also evidence of a correlation between pre-sleep cognitive activity and 
sleep-onset latency (SOL). Nicassio, Mendlowitz, Fussel & Petras (1985) found that, 
relative to somatic Pre Sleep Arousal Scale items (e.g. 'heart racing'), cognitive items (e.g. 
'can't shut off thoughts') were highly correlated with length of SOL. Similar data have 
also been reported by Van Egeren, Haynes, Franzen & Hamilton (1983). However, not 
all correlational studies support this proposal. Sanavio (1988) observed only a low 
correlation (0.09) between pre-sleep cognitions and self-report SOL. It therefore 
remains possible that excessive pre-sleep cognitive activity is merely an epiphenomenon 
of night-time wakefulness (Freedman & Sattler, 1982; Morin, 1993).
Several studies examining the content of insomniacs pre-sleep thoughts using 
questionnaire measures also suggest sleep onset difficulties may be linked to cognition. 
Coyle & Watts (1991) factor analysed 92 'sleep disturbed' participants responses to both 
the SDQ, and a second questionnaire assessing sleep-onset difficulties. Two of their 
resulting factors specifically related to cognition: sleep attitudes (reflecting concerns
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about not sleeping), and mental anxiety (reflecting elevated general cognitive activity). 
Using a similar methodology, Watts, Coyle & East (1994) explored pre-sleep cognitions 
in 38 insomniacs and 41 non-insomniacs, separated into worrier and non-worrier 
groupings. Factor analysis revealed 6 thought categories linked to initial insomnia: 
mental activity and rehearsal, thoughts about sleep, family and long time concerns, 
somatic preoccupation, work and recent concerns, and positive concerns and plans. 
Further analysis indicated insomnia was particularly associated with thoughts about 
sleep. Finally, Harvey (2000a) has shown that, relative to good sleepers (N = 30), 
insomniacs (N = 30) pre-sleep cognitions are more intrusive, and focused particularly 
with not sleeping, and with recent concerns. Other data also show that initial insomniacs 
employ strategies of thought suppression and reappraisal to control these negative pre­
sleep cognitions (Harvey, 2001), suggesting metacognitive beliefs about the significance 
of sleep-related intrusions may play a part in insomnia maintenance (Wells, 2001).
Other researchers have directly sampled the content of insomniacs pre-sleep 
cognitions. Van Egeren et al (1983) recorded the pre-sleep cognitions of 34 
undergraduates with initial insomnia who spent five nights in a sleep laboratory. 
Regression analysis indicated that cognitions during the pre-sleep phase, particularly 
thoughts about not falling asleep, were significantly associated with subjective, although 
not objective (EEG), SOL. Kuisk, Bertelson & Walsh (1989) sampled participant pre­
sleep cognitions by interviewing normal sleepers, objective insomniacs and subjective 
insomniacs (each N = 8) at 4 minute intervals during the pre-sleep phase. Their analysis 
indicated that both subjective and objective insomniac groups experienced more negative 
pre-sleep thoughts, relative to good sleepers.
Finally, Wicklow & Espie (2000) used voice activated tape recorders to sample 
the pre-sleep cognitions of 21 initial insomniacs. Content analysis of recordings revealed 
eight categories of pre-sleep intrusion: general problem solving, sleep and its
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consequences, reflection on quality of thoughts, arousal status, external noise, autonomic 
experiences, procedural factors and rising from bed. Wrist actigraphy was utilised as an 
objective measure of SOL, and correlational analysis of sleep data with intrusion 
categories demonstrated that the anticipated consequences of poor sleep, and general 
problem solving, were the strongest predictors of objective SOL.
Overall, the above studies clearly demonstrate an association between pre-sleep 
cognitive activity and sleep-onset difficulties. Data indicate that initial insomniacs pre­
sleep cognitions are typically intrusive, negative in affect, and relate to both recent 
problems, and the sleep process itself (cf. Borkovec, 1982).
It is important to note though that these findings are correlational, and therefore 
do not directly link pre-sleep cognitive activity with initial insomnia. However, direct 
evidence for this association has been provided by six studies which manipulated pre­
sleep cognitions using experimental methods. Four of these studies utilised good 
sleepers as participants. Gross & Borkovec (1982) demonstrated that increasing the 
likelihood of pre-sleep cognitions experimentally increases SOL amongst good sleepers. 
They informed one group of participants they were required to give a speech pertaining 
to a given topic ('speech plus topic') following an afternoon nap. 'Sleep only' controls 
were simply required to go to sleep. Data analysis based on both objective (EEG criteria) 
and self report measures indicated that, relative to controls, 'speech plus topic' participants 
displayed significantly longer objective SOL and shorter sleep duration (EEG). Similar 
data have also been reported by Hall, Buyse, Reynolds, Kupfer & Baum (1996). In their 
study, good sleepers told they were to deliver a 15 minute speech following a nights sleep 
displayed more stress-related intrusive thoughts, and significantly longer objective SOL, 
relative to controls. Similarly, Haynes, Adams & Franzen (1981) demonstrated that 
difficult mental arithmetic tasks completed during the pre-sleep period significantly 
increased objective (EEG) and subjective SOL amongst 11 good sleepers. Taken
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together, these findings offer more direct evidence that elevated pre-sleep cognition leads 
to delayed sleep-onset (cf. Espie & Wicklow, 2001).
Ansfield, Wegner & Bowser (1996) have also reported data which support this. 
They allocated 83 good sleepers to one of four experimental conditions aimed at testing 
Wegner's theory of ironic mental control (Wegner, 1994). Wegner's model suggests that 
under certain conditions, the desire to control a particular mental state (e.g. sleep, mood) 
can yield the ironic opposite of what is desired. Consistent with the model, Ansfield et 
al's data indicated that good sleepers instructed to sleep quickly whilst listening to 
marching music took the longest to fall asleep. They concluded that sleep urgency under 
conditions of high cognitive load may result in prolonged sleep-onset latency. Besides 
implicating the central role of pre-sleep thoughts in prolonging sleep-onset, these data 
also suggest that treatments which encourage insomniacs to minimise sleep effort and 
urgency (e.g. paradoxical intention; Ascher & Turner, 1979) under conditions of high 
cognitive load (e.g. sleep anxiety) may prove highly effective in reducing SOL.
Two further studies in the sleep literature experimentally manipulated the pre­
sleep cognitions of poor sleepers. Harvey (2000b) explored the effects of suppressing 
pre-sleep cognitive activity on SOL. A cohort of 30 insomniacs and 30 good sleepers 
were instructed to suppress the thought most likely to dominate their pre-sleep thinking 
(suppress condition) or to think about anything (non-suppression condition). Results 
indicated that 'suppress* participants showed longer subjective SOL and poorer sleep 
quality, regardless of whether they were insomniac or not. These data further implicate 
the role of cognition in initial insomnia, and suggest thought suppression, whilst used to 
turn off pre-sleep thinking, can have an opposite 'ironic' effect, fuelling cognitive activity 
and preventing sleep-onset (cf. Wegner, 1994). Finally, Haynes et al (1981) 
demonstrated in their study outlined above, that exposure to stressful mental arithmetic 
tasks decreased the objective and subjective SOL of 11 poor sleepers. These data may
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also be consistent with a cognitive arousal model of initial insomnia. They suggest that 
the stressful arithmetic tasks had a distracting effect on cognition, disrupting the usual 
pre-sleep thoughts of the poor sleepers, thereby hastening sleep-onset.
Taken together therefore, the above data indicate that experimental manipulation 
of pre-sleep cognitions can directly impact sleep-onset. Accordingly, they extend the 
correlational data outlined above, and offer the strongest and most direct support for a 
cognitive arousal model of initial insomnia (cf. Espie & Wicklow, 2001).
The relevance o f metacognitive models o f emotional disorder to initial insomnia
Metacognitive models of the anxiety disorders suggest that beliefs, processes and 
strategies which appraise, monitor or control cognition may be central in the aetiology of 
emotional disorder (Wells, 1997; 2001). As outlined above, considerable evidence 
indicates that insomniacs show marked levels of sleep-related intrusions. Given this, and 
the recent finding that insomniacs employ metacognitive thought control strategies to 
minimise sleep-related intrusions (Harvey, 2000b), it seems likely that metacognitive 
models of emotional disorder (see e.g. Wells, 1997; 2001) may offer a relevant 
theoretical framework for the study of insomnia. Specifically, the model assumes that 
anxiety incubates intrusions (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995), and that intrusions act to 
trigger negative metacognitive beliefs regarding their meaning and significance (Wells, 
1997; 2001). Thus, cognitive treatments such as paradoxical intention, which target sleep 
anxiety and lower sleep effort (Ascher & Turner, 1979), may not only reduce the 
frequency of sleep-related intrusions, but also lower activation of negative metacognitive 
beliefs (e.g. "Thinking about sleep makes my sleep worse"; "Thinking about sleep means 
I'm a poor sleeper"), which may characterise poor sleepers (cf. Harvey, 2000b). In turn , 
by reducing activation of negative sleep-related metacognitive beliefs, paradoxical 
intention may reduce poor sleepers conviction in their declarative beliefs regarding sleep
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("I'm a poor sleeper"), and thus alter their tendancy to overestimate sleep-latency 
(Borkovec, 1982). There is growing experimental evidence of the links between cognitive 
process, intrusions and metacognition in the anxiety literature (Wells, 2001), and in 
accord with this, future insomnia research programmes should take account of the 
influence of cognitive insomnia treatments on both pre-sleep intrusions and related 
metacognitive belief structures. There remains, at present, a lack of clinical and research 
data linking metacognitive constructs to disturbed sleep, although its conceptual relevance 
to insomnia is clear.
A cognitive arousal model o f initial insomnia
As is evident, there is now considerable evidence suggesting that pre-sleep 
cognitive activity mediates sleep-onset difficulties. Consequently, recent formulations of 
initial insomnia aetiology increasingly emphasise the role of cognitive variables in the 
development and maintenance of the condition.
For instance, in his multi-component model of insomnia aetiology, Espie (1991) 
highlights the central role of cognitive arousal in promoting and maintaining the 
condition. Similarly, Morin (1993) argues that a range of cognitive variables, including 
excessive cognitive activation, worry over sleep loss, effort to sleep, and beliefs that 
insomnia is uncontrollable and unpredictable, together act to bring on and maintain 
cognitive hyperarousal and insomnia. Both Harvey (2000 a,b) and Lundh (1998) have 
also suggested that pre-sleep cognitive activity, dysfunctional beliefs, and anxiety and 
worry about insufficient sleep are central in mediating initial insomnia. Indeed, research 
has shown that when insomniacs and good sleepers are awoken from Stage 2 sleep, 
insomniacs report being drowsy but thinking, whereas good sleepers report being asleep 
(Borkovec, Lane & VanOot, 1981).
Consistent with these accounts, Espie & Wicklow (2001) have recently argued
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that due to cognitive overarousal, insomniacs are not 'mentally well prepared' for bed. 
Their model predicts that good sleep should occur if individuals can achieve pre-sleep 
cognitive dearousal, comprising four desired states. First, a state of minimal information 
processing, where acute mental activity is attenuated; second, a state of minimal cognitive 
drive, where consideration of important matters and problem solving is minimised; third, 
a state of minimal effort, where effort to sleep and sleep urgency are attenuated, and 
fourth, a state of minimal affective load, where concern and anxiety relating to sleep, and 
the feared consequences of sleep loss, are minimised.
Cognitive treatments for initial insomnia
Based on these models, there has recently been a marked increase in the use of 
cognitive approaches in the clinical management of initial insomnia (Lundh, 1998; 
Morin, 1993). Thought stopping and articulatory suppression are cognitive treatments 
which focus on blocking pre-sleep intrusive thinking (Levey, Aldaz, Watts & Coyle, 
1991), whilst cognitive control attempts to prevent pre-sleep intrusions by scheduling 
time earlier in the day for worry (Espie & Lindsay, 1987). Paradoxical intention is 
thought to obviate performance anxiety and catastrophisation about sleep loss by 
requiring that patients attempt to remain awake (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). Finally, 
cognitive restructuring targets the content of sleep related cognitions, aiming to alter 
faulty expectations, attributions, beliefs and appraisals about insomnia (Morin, 1993).
Most of these cognitive techniques tend to be subsumed within a multi-faceted 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) package (cf. Morin, 1993). Preliminary CBT 
outcome data are highly promising, indicating that primary insomniacs treated with CBT 
show significant improvements on a range of sleep measures, relative to those receiving 
placebo treatments (Edinger, Radke, Wohlgemuth, Marsh & Quillan, 1997; Morin, 
Collechi, Stone, Sood & Brink, 1995). There is also evidence that items in the
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Dysfunctional Beliefs about Sleep Scale (DBAS-10) are sensitive to change following 
CBT treatments (Espie, Inglis, Harvey & Tessier, 2000). Unfortunately, the adoption of 
such integrative approaches has meant that few studies in the sleep literature provide any 
direct evidence of the utility of individual cognitive components subsumed within CBT 
treatment packages (Espie, 1991, Edinger & Wohlgemuth, 1999). However, one 
exception to this has been the clinical application of paradoxical intention.
Paradoxical Intention: A definition
The technique of paradoxical intention was originally developed by Frankl (1955) 
within the context of logotherapy. It has been widely utilised in the clinical treatment of a 
range of problems where performance anxiety has developed, including initial insomnia, 
urinary retention and orgasmic dysfunction (Ascher, 1979; Seltzer, 1986; Strong, 1984). 
The technique instructs patients to ’’intend" behaviour which is apparently in opposition 
to their goal. With respect to initial insomnia, paradoxical intention requires that 
insomniacs give up trying to sleep, and attempt instead to remain awake for as long as 
possible (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). Paradoxically, therefore, the likelihood of staying 
awake is reduced by encouragement to do so.
Paradoxical Intention: A performance anxiety model
Paradoxical intention is thought to operate by eliminating voluntary efforts to 
sleep, therefore minimising performance anxiety, an aroused state incompatible with sleep 
(Ascher & Turner, 1979). Insomniacs thus may inadvertently maintain their problem by 
trying to control the sleep process. Since sleep is a member of a class of behaviours 
which cannot be placed under full voluntary control, efforts to control sleep-onset fail, 
resulting in performance anxiety and, therefore, continued sleep disruption. Paradoxical 
intention appears to help by directing insomniacs to give up voluntary efforts to sleep
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which maintain their anxiety, thereby reducing arousal levels and promoting sleep 
(Ascher & Turner, 1979). Consistent with this model, good sleepers report they do 
nothing to fall asleep; good sleep is thus associated with minimal effort- an absence of 
performance effort, rather than performance success (Espie & Wicklow, 2001).
In terms of cognitive mechanisms of action, paradoxical intention acts as a de- 
catastrophising technique (Espie & Wicklow, 2001). The treatment requires insomniacs 
give up sleep effort and attempt instead to remain awake. It therefore decatastrophises 
anxious thoughts about staying awake initially by focusing on and enhancing these 
(habituation), and subsequently by appraising them via rationalisation and experience.
As a result, cognitive arousal levels are reduced, and sleep is promoted.
Recently, authors have framed the performance anxiety model of paradoxical 
intention in terms of Wegner's theory of ironic control (Wegner, 1994), with 
performance anxiety thought to constitute Wegner's 'cognitive load'. Consistent with this, 
a number of findings demonstrate that urgent attempts to sleep under circumstances of 
high cognitive load result in ironic wakefulness (e.g. Ansfield, Wegner & Bowser, 1996; 
Gross & Borkovec, 1982).
However, at present, the performance anxiety model of paradoxical intention 
remains largely untested. There is some evidence that paradoxical intention is more 
effective when used to treat individuals high in performance anxiety (Ascher & Schotte, 
1999), although these data come from a study of social phobics. Only one insomnia 
study has measured performance anxiety pre and post paradoxical intention in order to 
test Ascher & Turner's model directly. Fogle & Dyall (1983) allocated 22 chronic 
insomniacs to a 'give up trying' to sleep condition framed as a paradoxical sleep 
improvement method, or to a 'try giving up' treatment presented as a way of improving 
night-time comfort. A further 11 insomniacs received a control treatment (self 
monitoring). Results indicated that relative to controls, performance anxiety reduced
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significantly amongst both treatments groups. However, the authors failed to collect 
SOL data, nor did they measure effort to sleep. Moreover, analyses indicated all 
participants, including controls, improved on a subjective sleep efficiency measure. Thus, 
no firm conclusions regarding Ascher & Turner's performance anxiety model may be 
drawn. The theoretical link between paradoxical intention, reduced effort to sleep, and 
reduced performance anxiety in initial insomnia, therefore requires clarification (Espie & 
Lindsay, 1985).
It should also be noted that there is a marked lack of paradoxical intention 
research utilising objective sleep measures (Ott, Levine & Ascher, 1983). This is 
problematic, particularly given that insomniacs' self-report sleep data can be unreliable 
(Carskadon, Dement, Mitler, Guilleminault, Zarcone & Speigel, 1976). Objective and 
subjective sleep measures may also reflect differing response systems (Wicklow & 
Espie, 2000).
A reliable and minimally intrusive method of measuring sleep data objectively is 
the actigraph- a small wrist attachment containing internal motion sensors which record 
the wearers movements. There is increasing recognition that movement is a good 
predictor of wakefulness, whilst lack of movement is a good predictor of sleep (American 
Sleep Disorders Association, 1995). Moreover, actigraphic measures have been found to 
correlate highly (r = 0.80 - 0.95) with polysomnographic (PSG) data for global 
measures of sleep duration and total wake time (e.g. Sadeh, Hauri, Kripke & Lavie, 1995; 
Mullaney, Kripke & Messin, 1980), although lower rates of agreement have also been 
reported (Blood, Sack, Percy & Pen, 1995; Hauri & Wisbey, 1992). An examination of 
paradoxical intention and insomnia using actigraphy would therefore be desirable.
Paradoxical Intention: Evidence of efficacy
The application of paradoxical intention to initial insomnia has received some
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research attention. A number of clinical case studies have demonstrated the utility of the 
procedure in reducing insomniacs SOL (Ascher, 1975; Ascher & Efran, 1978; Espie & 
Lindsay, 1985; Relinger, Borstein & Mungus, 1978; Relinger & Bomstein, 1979).
Following the earliest case reports, a series of experimental studies were 
conducted comparing alternative methods of paradoxical intention delivery. Two 
approaches have dominated the literature. Reframing is based on traditional methods for 
delivering paradoxical directives, and involves instructing patients to stay awake in order 
to collect data about their thoughts. Patients are told this information will be used to 
develop an individualised therapeutic program (e.g. Relinger et al, 1978). In contrast, a 
second approach involves providing the patient with a straightforward description of 
paradoxical intention, followed by an outline of how the technique may help reduce SOL 
(e.g. Ascher & Turner, 1979). A series of studies suggest that, in experimental settings, 
where participants are randomly allocated to condition, the latter method of delivery is 
consistently superior in alleviating sleep-onset insomnia (Ascher & Turner, 1980; Ott et 
al, 1983).
A number of randomised-controlled trials examining the efficacy of paradoxical 
intention have also been reported. Findings demonstrate the superiority of paradoxical 
intention over control conditions in reducing SOL (Ascher & Turner, 1979, 1980), and 
its equivalence to other active treatments (stimulus control, progressive relaxation) in 
ameliorating initial insomnia (Espie, Lindsay, Brooks Hood & Turvey, 1989; Ladocuer 
& Gros-Loius, 1986; Turner & Ascher, 1979). Indeed, paradoxical intention is now 
regarded as a "probably efficacious" insomnia treatment according to American 
Psychological Association criteria (Chesson, Anderson, Littner, Davila, & Hartse, 1999; 
Morin, Hauri, Espie, Spielman, Buysse & Bootzin, 1999).
Paradoxical Intention: Evidence of response variability
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However, despite Morin et al's (1999) recent conclusions, other research findings 
have been less positive. For instance, data reported by Lacks, Berteson, Gans & Kunkel 
(1983) and Turner & Ascher (1982) failed to demonstrate any significant differences 
between paradoxical intention and control conditions. Other authors have highlighted 
considerable variability in therapeutic response following paradoxical intention, with 
some insomniacs actually worsening as a result of its application (Espie et al, 1989;
Lacks et al, 1983).
Espie & Lindsay (1985) presented a series of six case studies of insomniacs 
treated as part of a larger study using paradoxical intention. Of these, three responded 
promptly to paradoxical intention, maintaining improvements at 3 month follow up. 
However, three individuals showed increased SOL, two of whom had to discontinue 
paradoxical treatment due to the extent of their sleep latency exacerbation. Interestingly, 
subsequent successful treatment using progressive relaxation suggested they were not 
merely poor treatment responders.
The reasons for such response variability remain unclear (Morin, 1993).
However, in attempting to account for this, Espie & Lindsay (1985) have suggested that 
some patients may follow paradoxical instructions ("stay awake") and/or counterdemand 
instructions ("do not expect to see any improvement for 2 weeks of the study") literally. 
Counterdemand instructions are routinely included in paradoxical intention studies to 
control for demand characteristics and patient outcome expectations. Certainly, future 
research is needed to examine the extent to which certain patients may worsen as a result 
of adhering to such paradoxical instructions literally. Moreover, there is also a need to 
explore the effect of including and excluding counterdemand instructions on therapeutic 
response within a paradoxical intention paradigm.
Espie & Lindsay (1985) also suggest that paradoxical intention may only be 
suitable for individuals high in effort to sleep and performance anxiety (cf. Ascher &
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Turner, 1979). As noted, it is assumed that paradoxical intention operates to reduce SOL 
by alleviating effort to sleep and obviating performance anxiety, and as outlined above, 
there is tentative evidence for this proposal from the insomnia (Fogle & Dyall, 1983) and 
clinical treatment literature's (Ascher & Schotte, 1999). Thus, non-responders may be 
unsuited to paradoxical intention due to low levels of performance anxiety and effort to 
sleep. An initial empirical examination of changes in effort to sleep and performance 
anxiety amongst insomniacs exposed to paradoxical intention would resolve this, and 
clarify the performance anxiety model of paradoxical intention. Subsequent research 
could then allocate individuals to insomnia treatment programmes including or excluding 
paradoxical intention, based on pre-morbid effort to sleep and performance anxiety 
measures. It has also been suggested that paradoxical intention may not be suitable for 
individuals who show severe pre-sleep cognitive activity (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). 
Research is therefore required to clarify this issue. Moreover, future studies should also 
examine whether response variability relates to the severity of sleep disturbance (Espie & 
Lindsay, 1985).
Paradoxical intention is an empirically-supported psychological treatment for 
insomnia (Morin et al, 1999). However, for a significant minority of patients it may 
result, at least initially, in exacerbated sleep disturbance (Espie & Lindsay, 1985; Lacks 
et al, 1983). There is therefore a clear need for experimental research using objective 
sleep measures (Ott et al, 1983) in order to clarify both the theoretical rationale, and 
underlying mechanisms, of paradoxical intention (Ascher & Turner, 1979). In turn, 
such work should determine the utility of paradoxical intention as a general treatment 
approach (Espie & Lindsay, 1985).
Summary and conclusions
Recently, evidence has converged supporting a cognitive arousal model of initial
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insomnia (Espie & Wicklow, 2001). Accordingly, in recent years, cognitive treatments 
for the condition have become increasingly popular. One widely studied cognitive 
technique in treating initial insomnia is paradoxical intention - a treatment approach 
thought to operate by eliminating effort to sleep, and therefore reducing sleep related 
performance anxiety (Ascher & Turner, 1979). However, this proposal remains largely 
untested. Moreover, some response variability following paradoxical intention has been 
reported, the reasons for which remain largely unclear (Espie & Lindsay, 1985).
Research is therefore required to clarify the performance anxiety model of paradoxical 
intention, and to explore further whether some patients exposed to the treatment follow 
instructions to stay awake literally (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). There is also a need to 
clarify the association between severity of both sleep-onset insomnia, pre-sleep cognitive 
activity and therapeutic response. Finally, an examination of paradoxical intention and 
insomnia using objective actigraphic methods is required. Together, such research 
should prove useful in clarifying the utility of paradoxical intention as a general treatment 
approach for initial insomnia.
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1.2 Title
Initial insomnia and paradoxical intention: an experimental investigation using actigraphic 
measurement of sleep.
1.3 Summary
In recent years, cognitive treatments for initial insomnia have become increasingly 
popular (Espie & Wicklow, 2001). One widely studied cognitive technique for initial 
insomnia is paradoxical intention. Paradoxical intention is thought to alleviate insomnia 
by eliminating effort to sleep, and therefore reducing sleep related performance anxiety 
(Ascher & Turner, 1979a). However, this proposal remains largely untested (Fogle & 
Dyall, 1983). Moreover, whilst outcome studies from clinical case reports and 
experimental studies suggest the technique can be very useful (Ascher & Turner, 1979a), 
some response variability has also been reported. The reasons for this response 
variability remain largely unclear, but may relate to literal interpretation of counterdemand 
instructions (Espie & Lindsay, 1985).
The present study will therefore examine experimentally, using objective 
measures of sleep, the extent to which paradoxical intention can alleviate sleep difficulties 
in a cohort of initial insomniacs. In addition, by recording levels of sleep related 
performance anxiety pre and post intervention, the study will also explore the 
performance anxiety model of paradoxical intention.
A cohort of 38 chronic initial insomniacs will be randomly assigned to one of two
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conditions (paradoxical intention ; control). A range of objective and subjective measures 
of sleep, effort to sleep, and performance anxiety will be recorded at baseline, 
intervention and post-intervention phases. Subsequent analyses of variance will examine 
the effects of paradoxical intention on participants sleep patterns and performance 
anxiety levels. Results will be discussed in terms of the performance anxiety model of 
paradoxical intention (Ascher & Turner, 1979a), and Wegner's model of ironic cognitive 
control (Wegner, 1994).
Obtained data will have important implications for the clinical application of 
paradoxical intention, both in terms of its utility as a general treatment approach, and its 
predicted suitability particularly for individuals high in performance anxiety and effort to 
sleep (Espie & Wicklow, 2001).
1.4 Introduction
Recently, evidence has converged that pre-sleep cognitive activity may be an 
important determinant of initial insomnia aetiology (Espie, 1991). Accordingly, current 
models of insomnia posit the role of cognitive factors in the development and 
maintenance of the condition (Espie & Wicklow, 1999; Morin, 1993). Furthermore, 
insomnia treatment programmes now routinely emphasise cognitive techniques in the 
treatment of the condition. However, these are almost always incorporated in a CBT 
"package", with few studies directly using cognitive techniques alone (Espie, 1991).
One exception has been the clinical application of paradoxical intention.
Originally labelled by Frankl (1955), the technique instructs clients to "intend" behaviour 
which is apparently in opposition to their goal. With respect to sleep difficulties, 
paradoxical intention requires that insomniacs give up trying to sleep, and attempt, 
instead, to remain awake for as long as possible (Ott, Levine & Ascher, 1983). 
Paradoxically, therefore, the likelihood of staying awake is reduced by encouragement to
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do so.
In terms of mechanisms of action, paradoxical intention is thought to operate by 
eliminating voluntary efforts to sleep, therefore minimising performance anxiety, an 
aroused state incompatible with sleep (Ascher & Turner, 1979a). Insomniacs thus may 
inadvertently maintain their problem by trying to control the sleep process. Since sleep is 
a member of a class of behaviours which cannot be placed under full voluntary control, 
efforts to control sleep-onset fail, resulting in performance anxiety and, therefore, 
continued sleep disruption. Paradoxical intention appears to help by directing 
insomniacs to give up voluntary efforts to sleep which maintain their anxiety, thereby 
reducing arousal levels and promoting sleep (Ascher & Turner, 1979). Consistent with 
this model, good sleepers report they do nothing to fall asleep; good sleep is thus 
associated with minimal effort- an absence of performance effort, rather than 
performance success (Espie & Wicklow, 2001). More recently, certain authors have 
framed this performance anxiety model in terms of Wegner's theory of ironic control, 
with performance anxiety thought to constitute Wegner's 'cognitive load' (Ansfield, 
Wegner & Bowser, 1996; Ascher & Schotte, 1999).
However, at present, the performance anxiety model of paradoxical intention 
remains largely untested. There is some evidence that paradoxical intention is more 
effective when used to treat individuals high in performance anxiety (Ascher & Schotte, 
1999), although these data come from a study of social phobics. Only one insomnia 
study has recorded performance anxiety data pre and post paradoxical intervention.
Fogle & Dyall (1983) noted that performance anxiety reduced significantly amongst 
insomniacs following paradoxical but not control instructions. However, no data for 
sleep-onset latency (SOL) were collected, and since both paradox and control participants 
improved on a subjective sleep efficiency measure, no firm conclusions regarding the 
performance anxiety model of paradox can be drawn. Clearly therefore, the theoretical 
link between paradoxical intention, reduced effort to sleep, and reduced performance
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anxiety merits clarification. It has also been suggested that paradoxical intention may 
only be suited to individuals high in performance anxiety and effort to sleep (Espie & 
Lindsay, 1985). This issue also merits experimental clarification, particularly given its 
relevance in determining the utility of paradoxical intention as a general treatment 
approach.
Moreover, there is a lack of research in insomnia and paradoxical intention 
utilising objective measures of sleep (Ott et al, 1983). This is problematic, particularly 
given that self report sleep data may have limited reliability and validity (Carskadon, 
Dement, Mitler, Guilleminault, Zarcone & Speigel, 1976). A closer examination of 
paradoxical intention and insomnia using objective sleep data would therefore be 
desirable.
Evidence regarding the efficacy of paradoxical intention is somewhat mixed. 
Findings from a number of clinical case studies indicate its superiority over control 
conditions in alleviating insomnia (Ascher, 1975; Ascher & Efran, 1978; Relinger & 
Borstein, 1979). Moreover, experimental studies of paradoxical intention, where patients 
are randomly allocated to treatment conditions, indicate its superiority over placebo 
control (Ascher & Turner, 1979a), and suggest it matches the efficacy of other active 
treatments (stimulus control, relaxation) in alleviating insomnia (Espie, Lindsay, Brooks, 
Hood & Turvey, 1989; Turner & Ascher, 1979). However, other studies have revealed 
some response variability, with certain insomniacs worsening following its application 
(Espie & Lindsay, 1985).
Counterdemand instructions, where participants are told not to expect immediate 
sleep improvements (Steinmark & Borkovec, 1974), have been used in a number of 
outcome studies comparing paradoxical intention with other insomnia treatments (e.g. 
Turner & Ascher, 1979; Espie et al, 1989). Such instructions are included to eliminate 
demand characteristics and placebo effects. It has been suggested that response 
variability following paradoxical intention may be due to participants interpreting these
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instructions literally, although this is unclear (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). An experimental 
examination is therefore necessary to clarify to what extent non-responding may relate to 
misinterpretation of counterdemand instructions. In turn, this will further ascertain to 
what extent paradoxical intention may be suitable as a general treatment approach for 
initial insomnia.
1.5 Aims and hypotheses 
Primary aims:
1. To examine, experimentally, the utility of paradoxical intention in reducing objective 
(wrist actigraphy) and subjective (sleep diaiy) SOL and sleep efficiency in chronic initial 
insomniacs.
2. To examine the effect of paradoxical intention on self-reported performance anxiety 
and effort to sleep, thus exploring, empirically, the performance anxiety model of 
insomnia and paradox.
3. To examine differential therapeutic response due to the presence/absence of 
counterdemand instructions.
Hypotheses are as follows:
1. Insomniacs allocated to the paradoxical intention condition will, relative to controls, 
show a reduction in objective and subjective SOL, and an increase in objective and 
subjective sleep efficiency.
2. Insomniacs allocated to paradoxical intention will, relative to controls, show a 
reduction in sleep related performance anxiety and effort to sleep.
3. Insomniacs who do not receive counterdemand instructions may respond significantly 
better to paradoxical intention in terms of objective and subjective SOL and sleep 
efficiency.
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1.6 Plan of investigation
1.6.1 Participants
Following previous research, a cohort of 38 chronic initial insomniacs, each 
randomly allocated to one of two conditions (Paradoxical Intention; Control), will be run. 
Power calculations across the three primary outcome variables (Objective SOL,
Subjective SOL and Sleep related performance anxiety) were run using the UCLA power 
calculator. Mean and standard deviation data were drawn from Ott, Levine & Ascher 
(1983) and Fogle & Dyall (1983), two recent similar studies. Significance level was set 
at p < 0.05, power = 0.8. Calculations indicated the need for between 15 - 20 participants 
in each group (n = 15 for Objective SOL; n= 19 for Subjective SOL; n = 14 for 
Performance Anxiety).
Participant inclusion and exclusion criteria will be as standard for identification of 
sleep-onset insomniacs (cf. Wicklow & Espie, 2000) i.e. age between 16 and 65 years, 
clinically significant sleep problems cf. ICSD (American Sleep Disorder Association, 
1997) = > 30 mins. to fall asleep at least 4 nights per week, and scores in excess of 5 on 
the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (Buysse, Reynolds, Monk et al, 1989; see Appendix
2.2). Exclusion will be based on concurrent treatment, complicating medical conditions, 
psychopathological disorders, etc.
Possible participants will be identified using email, posters in the university and 
local hospitals, and via the university staff newsletter. These methods have been utilised 
successfully by previous researchers in this department.
Participation will require attendance at an initial screening interview, an 
instructions interview and a feedback interview. Each participant will take 3 weeks to run, 
and all participants will receive both the paradoxical intention treatment (whether during 
the study or after), and general sleep hygiene education at the end of the study.
55
1.6.2 Measures:
Participants will complete several intake questionnaires prior to participation (e.g. 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index- Buysse et al, 1989- see Appendix 2.2; Sleep History 
Questionnaire- Morin, 1993- see Appendix 2.3). A measure of depression (Beck 
Depression Inventory; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) will be utilised to exclude 
participants (> 20 points), whilst a measure of anxiety (Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) will also be completed pre-baseline. 
Participants will, following allocation to experimental condition, complete a credibility 
rating sheet to assess their perception of the credibility of instructions given. Self-report 
data regarding participant adherence to the experimental instructions, and paradoxical 
intention participants understanding of the treatment given, will also be collected at the 
end of the study.
Objective sleep data will be collected using actigraphic methods (cf. Wicklow & 
Espie, 2000). The actigraph is a small wrist attachment containing internal motion 
sensors which record the wearers movements. There is recognition that movement is a 
good predictor of wakefulness, whilst lack of movement is a good predictor of sleep 
(American Sleep Disorders Association, 1995). Wrist actigraphic recordings will be 
made using the "Actiwatch" (Model AW2 Registered Cambridge Neurotechnology Ltd). 
Two sleep variables will be recorded:
Sleep-onset latency (minutes)
Sleep efficiency (%)
Subjective sleep data will be recorded via sleep diaries (Espie, 1991), completed each 
morning during the study. Measures will include:
Estimated sleep-onset latency 
Estimated sleep efficiency (%)
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Restedness rating upon awakening (6 point Likert scale)
Sleep related performance anxiety will be assessed at Baseline, Weeks One and Two via 
the scale developed and utilised by Fogle & Dyall (1983). Some internal consistency 
data have been reported for the scale (see Fogle & D yall, 1983, p. 26). A second scale 
may also be developed and piloted by the authors prior to commencement of the study, 
and then additionally employed to measure sleep anxiety.
1.6.3 Design and procedure
Following Ott et al (1983), the experimental design will integrate one Between 
participants factor (Instructional Set: Paradoxical Intention; Control) and one Within 
participants factor (Time: baseline; Treatment Week One; Treatment Week Two). A 
series of repeated measures ANOVAs will note effects of manipulation of these 
independent variables on a range of dependent measures of sleep (objective and 
subjective), performance anxiety, and effort to sleep.
Sleep data will be analysed in terms of weekly averages (cf. Ott et al, 1983). 
Thus, baseline data (all sleep measures, performance anxiety and effort to sleep) will be 
collected for a week and averaged. Two 'treatment' weeks of data will then be collated 
and meaned across Treatment' Week One and Treatment' Week Two. Instructional sets 
will be delivered on a piece of paper to participants following their baseline week at a 
meeting with the researcher. Participants will be invited to ask any questions regarding 
what is required of them. These will be answered in as standardised a fashion as is 
possible.
Half of the paradoxical intention participants will receive counterdemand and 
positive demand instructions as standard ("Do not expect to see any improvement during 
Week 1 of the experiment, but by the beginning of Week 2 you will begin to see 
dramatic improvements"; cf. Steinmark & Borkovec, 1974), whilst half will only receive
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positive demand characteristics ("The above instructions should have an immediate effect 
on your sleep"). This will clarify whether the non-responding reported in the literature 
may relate to participants misinterpreting counterdemand instructions as a literal demand 
to show no improvement.
1.6.4 Settings and equipment
All equipment will be obtained within the Department of Psychological Medicine 
at Glasgow University. This includes actigraph equipment, questionnaires, self report 
measures and all necessary computing resources.
1.6.5 Data analysis
Data analysis will be conducted using SuperAnova and SPSS. Measures of 
sleep (subjective and objective) and performance anxiety will be scored and analysed 
using both descriptive and inferential (ANOVA) methods. Any necessary data 
transformations will be completed prior to inferential analyses.
1.7 Practical Applications
The study has important implications for the clinical application of paradoxical 
intention to initial insomniacs. It is clear from the literature that not all individuals benefit 
from the intervention. Demonstration, experimentally, of the mechanisms of action of 
paradoxical intention i.e. reduction of performance anxiety and effort to sleep, will have 
implications for identifying which individuals (e.g. those high in performance anxiety 
and sleep effort pre-intervention) are most likely to benefit from the procedure in future 
clinical settings (cf. Espie & Lindsay, 1985). In turn, this will determine the utility of 
paradoxical intention as a general treatment approach for chronic initial insomnia.
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1.8 Timescales
Data collection will commence immediately following ethical approval (05/2000) 
and should require 6-10 months. Data analysis and scoring will be completed by 
03/2001 and write up completed by 06/2001.
1.9 Ethical Approval
Forms will be submitted to the Greater Glasgow Primary Care Trust Ethics 
Committee for the May 11th meeting (Submission deadline 27th April). The proposal 
will also be sent to the relevant University Faculties for approval to contact potential 
participants thereafter.
Trust ethical approval was granted in August 2000- see Appendix 2.4. Approval 
was also granted from the various University Faculties concerned prior to students being 
contacted by email for participation.
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Abstract
Although Paradoxical Intention (PI) is now regarded as an empirically- 
supported treatment for initial insomnia, few PI studies have measured outcome using 
objective sleep measurement. Moreover, mechanisms underlying PI remain unclear. 
The present experiment therefore examined the effect of PI on both objective (wrist 
actigraphy) and subjective (self-report) measures of sleep. Sleep performance 
anxiety and sleep effort data were also collected. Following a seven night baseline, 
thirty-four initial insomniacs were randomly allocated to fourteen nights of PI, or to a 
control (no PI) condition. Analysis of actigraphic sleep data indicated no significant 
differences between PI participants and controls in terms of objective SOL. However, 
PI resulted in a clinically significant reduction in self-reported SOL and sleep 
anxiety. These results may relate to recent metacognitive models of anxiety. 
Consistent with the performance anxiety model of PI, there was a significant 
reduction in sleep effort as well as sleep anxiety following PI. Correlational analysis 
also revealed a significant association between reduced sleep effort and reduced 
subjective SOL, which supports recent models of ironic cognitive control. Together, 
results help determine putative mechanisms underlying PI, and have important 
implications for the clinical application of PI. The need for further research 
investigating sleep effort, sleep anxiety and PI using objective and subjective sleep
measurement is emphasised.
Key words: Initial Insomnia, Paradoxical Intention, Performance Anxiety, Actigraphy
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Introduction
Recently, evidence has converged suggesting that pre-sleep cognitive activity
may be an important determinant of initial insomnia (cf. Espie & Wicklow, 2001).
For instance, research has shown that insomniacs attribute their poor sleep to 
cognitive factors (Espie, Brooks & Lindsay, 1989a; Harvey, 2000a; Lichstein & 
Rosenthal, 1980), and typically experience pre-sleep thoughts which are intrusive, 
negative in affect, and related to both recent problems, and the sleep process itself 
(Coyle & Watts, 1991; Harvey, 2000a; Wicklow & Espie, 2000). Moreover, 
correlational studies show a strong association between pre-sleep cognitive activity 
and sleep-onset latency (SOL; Nicassio, Mendlowitz, Fussel & Petras, 1985; Van 
Egeren, Haynes, Franzen & Hamilton, 1983), whilst experimental studies indicate that 
direct manipulation of pre-sleep cognitive activity can delay SOL amongst both good 
(Ansfield, Wegner & Bowser, 1996; Gross & Borkovec, 1982; Hall, Buysse, 
Reynolds, Kupfer & Baum, 1996; Harvey, 2000a) and poor sleepers (Harvey,
2000a).
Accordingly, recent formulations now emphasise the role of cognitive 
variables in insomnia aetiology (Espie & Wicklow, 2001; Lundh, 1998; Morin,
1993), and as a result, cognitive techniques have become increasingly popular in the 
management of the condition (e.g. cognitive restructuring- Morin, 1993; cognitive 
control- Espie & Lindsay, 1987; articulatory suppression- Levey, Aldaz, Watts & 
Coyle, 1991; paradoxical intention- Espie & Lindsay, 1985). However, the majority 
of these techniques tend to be subsumed within a multifaceted cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) package (e.g. Espie, Inglis, Tessier & Harvey, 2001; Edinger, Radtke, 
Wohlgemuth, Marsh & Quillan, 1997; Morin, Colecchi, Stone, Sood, & Brink,
1995). Such integrative approaches have meant few studies provide direct evidence of 
the utility of individual cognitive components subsumed within CBT treatment 
packages (Espie, 1991, Edinger & Wohlgemuth, 1999).
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One cognitive technique that has been studied in isolation is Paradoxical 
Intention (PI). PI instructs patients to "intend" behaviour which is apparently in 
opposition to their goal (Ascher, 1979; Seltzer, 1986; Strong, 1984). With respect to 
initial insomnia, it requires that insomniacs give up trying to sleep, and attempt instead 
to remain awake (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). Paradoxically, therefore, the likelihood of 
staying awake is reduced by encouragement to do so.
Both clinical case reports (e.g. Ascher, 1975; Ascher & Efran, 1978; Espie & 
Lindsay, 1985) and group studies (e.g. Ascher & Turner, 1979,1980; Espie, Lindsay, 
Brooks, Hood & Turvey, 1989; Ladocuer & Gros-Loius, 1986) demonstrate the 
efficacy of PI in reducing SOL, and PI is now regarded as a "probably efficacious" 
insomnia treatment according to American Psychological Association criteria 
(Chesson, Anderson, Littner, Davila, & Hartse, 1999; Morin, Hauri, Espie, Spielman, 
Buysse & Bootzin, 1999).
However, very few studies have examined the effects of PI using objective 
sleep measures (Ott, Levine & Ascher, 1983). Insomniacs' self-report sleep data can 
be unreliable (Carskadon, Dement, Mitler, Guilleminault, Zarcone & Speigel, 1976), 
and objective and subjective sleep measures may reflect differing response systems 
(Wicklow & Espie, 2000). An examination of PI using objective sleep 
measurement would therefore be desirable.
A reliable and minimally intrusive objective sleep measure is the actigraph- a 
small wrist attachment which records the wearer's movements. There is recognition 
that movement is a good predictor of wakefulness, whilst lack of movement is a good 
predictor of sleep (American Sleep Disorders Association, 1995; Mullaney, Kripke & 
Messin, 1980). Moreover, actigraphic measures correlate highly with 
polysomnographic (PSG) data for sleep duration and total wake time (e.g. Sadeh, 
Hauri, Kripke & Lavie, 1995; Mullaney, Kripke & Messin, 1980). Therefore, wrist 
actigraphy provided a valid, minimally intrusive measure of objective sleep in the 
context of the present study.
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The precise mechanisms underlying PI also remain unclear. PI is thought to 
operate by eliminating voluntary sleep effort, therefore minimising performance 
anxiety, an aroused state incompatible with sleep (Ascher & Turner, 1979). However, 
this performance anxiety model remains untested (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). Whilst 
one study noted that performance anxiety declined following PI (Fogle & Dyall, 
1983), the researchers failed to collect SOL or sleep effort data. Moreover, 
participants not receiving PI also improved on a subjective sleep efficiency measure. 
Thus, the link between improved sleep, PI, sleep effort and sleep anxiety remains 
unclear. The present study aimed to clarify this performance anxiety model of PI.
Recently, PI has also been framed in terms of ironic cognitive control 
(Wegner, 1994), with sleep performance anxiety thought to constitute Wegner's 
cognitive load (Ansfield, Wegner & Bowser, 1996). In Wegner's model, two 
cognitive processes involved in mental control are identified: a conscious intentional 
operating process which searches for cognitions yielding a desired mental state, and 
an automatic ironic monitoring process which searches for opposing cognitions. 
Wegner suggests that under high cognitive load, the intentional operating process is 
undermined, and the ironic monitor predominates. Applying this to sleep, urgent 
attempts to fall asleep under high cognitive load should result in ironic wakefulness, 
and there is already some experimental evidence for this (Ansfield et al, 1996). By 
measuring sleep effort and sleep anxiety data, the present study aimed to clarify a 
complementary prediction- that attempts to stay awake under high cognitive load 
(sleep performance anxiety) result in an opposite, ironic mental state i.e. faster sleep 
onset (cf. Wegner, 1994.)
Metacognitive models of emotional disorder (Wells, 1997; 2001) may also 
prove relevant in considering the impact of PI on initial insomnia, particularly given 
the hypothesised central role of pre-sleep intrusions in the condition (e.g. Harvey, 
2000a). Such models posit the existence of negative meta-cognitive beliefs which are 
triggered by, and concern the meaning and significance of, intrusive thoughts. Since
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it has already been demonstrated that anxiety incubates intrusive thoughts (Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1995), PI, by reducing sleep anxiety, may in turn lower activation of 
negative metacognitive beliefs, thereby leading to declarative belief change, and a 
reduction in overestimated self-report SOL frequently seen in insomnia (Borkovec, 
1982).
Although PI is now regarded as an empirically-supported insomnia treatment 
(Morin et al,1999), certain researchers have failed to report significant treatment 
effects (Lacks, Berteson, Gans & Kunkel, 1983; Turner & Ascher, 1982), whilst 
others have reported some insomniacs worsening as a result of the approach (Espie et 
al, 1989b; Lacks et al, 1983). Counterdemand instructions ("do not expect to see any 
improvement for 2 weeks of the study") have been included in some PI studies to 
control for demand characteristics and patient outcome expectations (cf. Steinmark & 
Borkovec, 1974). It has been suggested non-responding following PI may relate to 
participants interpreting these and/or paradoxical instructions ("stay awake for as 
long as possible") too literally (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). In order to clarify this, only 
half of participants allocated to PI in the present experiment received counterdemand 
instructions, whilst at the end of the study, questioning explored how PI participants 
employed the technique. Clarification of these non-response issues may in turn help 
determine the suitability of PI as a general treatment approach for insomnia.
In sum, the present study offers an experimental examination of the efficacy 
of brief (2 week) PI, using both objective (actigraphy) and subjective (self-report 
diary) measurements of sleep. Furthermore, by recording both effort to sleep and 
sleep performance anxiety data, putative mechanisms underlying PI were explored. 
Factors thought to account for non-responding following PI were also examined.
Primary hypotheses were that insomniacs allocated to PI would, relative to 
controls, show a reduction in objective and subjective SOL (cf. Ascher & Turner, 
1979,1980), and an increase in objective and subjective sleep efficiency. In addition, 
insomniacs allocated to PI would, relative to controls, show a reduction in both sleep
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performance anxiety and sleep effort (cf. Ascher & Turner, 1979). Finally, 
insomniacs not receiving counterdemand instructions would respond significantly 
more to PI in terms of objective and subjective sleep parameters (Espie & Lindsay, 
1985).
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited using the University email system and via notices 
placed locally. Ethical approval was granted by both the Health Trust and University. 
Prior to participation, potential participants completed questionnaires assessing sleep 
(Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index [PSQI; see Appendix 2.2]- Buysse, Reynolds,
Monk, Berman & Kupfer, 1989; Sleep History Questionnaire- Morin, 1993, see 
Appendix 2.3), anxiety (Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory- STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970), worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire- PSWQ; Myer, 
Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) and depression (Beck Depression Inventory- 
BDI; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996).
Respondents were included if they were between 16 and 65 years, complained 
of clinically significant problems falling asleep according to the International 
Classification of Sleep Disorders (American Sleep Disorder Association, 1997; i.e. 
SOL greater than 30 min at least 4 nights per week, with or without disruption to 
other sleep variables), and scored in excess of 5 on the PSQI (Buysse et al, 1989). 
Participants were excluded if they experienced intermittent awakenings without sleep- 
onset difficulties, were receiving treatment for sleeping difficulties, or were suffering 
any medical or psychopathological disorder impacting on sleep.
Forty-six participants were finally recruited all meeting criteria. 34 completed 
the study (73.91%). A further seven failed to attend the initial meeting, three 
withdrew during baseline, whilst two were excluded due to unreliable diary and scale
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completion. Mean age of completing participants was 25.18 years, with an average 
sleep disturbance of 6.35 years.
Measures
Participants completed a daily sleep diary (Espie, 1991) upon rising, 
recording time to bed, rise time, time to fall asleep, and total sleep time (see Appendix
3.2). This data provided measures of subjective SOL, and sleep efficiency- a 
percentage of total sleep time divided by total time in bed widely employed in sleep 
research (Morin, 1993). Daily effort to sleep and restedness data were also recorded 
on a seven point scale (anchor points 0 "not at a l l ", 6 "very much"; see Appendix
3.2).
Wrist actigraphic recording using the 'Actiwatch' (Model AW2; Cambridge 
Neurotechnology Ltd) provided objective SOL and sleep efficiency data. Participants 
wore the actigraph continuously on their non-dominant hand except during wet 
activities. An event marker on the actigraph was depressed at lights out, and upon 
rising. Epoch length was set at 1 min (cf. Wicklow & Espie, 2000), with 'sleep' or 
'wakefulness' determined by the program's algorithm.
Two self-report scales were utilised to measure sleep-related performance 
anxiety. First, in order to extend previous findings, the Sleep Anxiety Scale (SAS; 
Fogle & Dyall, 1983; see Appendix 3.3) was employed. Some internal consistency 
data for this scale have been reported (see Fogle & D yall, 1983, p. 26).
Participants also completed a specially developed scale, the Sleep 
Performance Anxiety Questionnaire (SPAQ; Broomfield & Espie, 2001; see 
Appendix 3.4). This comprised seven components of dysfunctional sleep monitoring 
(sleep effort, sleep control, sleep avoidance, bedtime worry, performance failure, 
anticipatory anxiety, and daytime worry). Prior to the study, the SPAQ was 
administered to four good and four poor sleepers. Data suggested the scale readily 
distinguished these groups (good sleepers mean score = 7.75, SD = 0.96; poor
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sleepers mean score = 15.50, SD = 3.69).
Following training in paradoxical intention, PI participants completed a 
credibility rating sheet (see Appendix 3.5). Control subjects did not complete a 
credibility rating sheet. At the end of the study, they were also asked how they 
employed the procedure ("What did you do when you went to bed?"), and any effects 
it had ("What effects, if any, did the treatment have?"). At the end of the study, all 
participants completed a compliance rating sheet (see Appendix 3.6).
Design
The study employed a One Between (Condition: Paradoxical Intention 
Therapy [PI], Control) and One Within participants factor (Time: Baseline, Week 
One, Week Two) design. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental 
condition by the experimenter using a predetermined list of numbers.
Procedure
Following a telephone interview, participants were sent screening 
questionnaires, an information sheet, and an informed consent slip. These were 
completed and returned by post. Participants then met with the experimenter 
(meeting 1), were instructed to complete their sleep diary upon rising, for 21 days, 
and were supplied with a wrist actigraph. Participants were then told the next seven 
days was a baseline measurement week.
At meeting 2, participants completed the two sleep anxiety scales (Baseline), 
and were issued with further copies to be completed after seven days (Week One). 
Participants were then randomly allocated to an experimental condition (PI with 
counterdemand instructions; PI with no counterdemand instructions; Control).
PI participants were introduced to a diagram of the performance anxiety 
model of PI (cf. Ascher & Turner, 1979; see Appendix 3.7). The role of sleep effort
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and performance anxiety in maintaining initial insomnia was highlighted, and the 
rationale of PI was explained. PI participants were then given an instruction sheet (cf. 
Ott et al, 1983), asking them to apply PI for fourteen nights. Those allocated to the 
PI counterdemand condition were told not expect to see sleep improvement for the 
first week of the study, but to improve thereafter (see Appendix 3.8). PI participants 
not receiving counterdemand instructions were told to expect immediate improvement 
in their sleep (see Appendix 3.9). Control participants received instructions to 
continue wearing the actigraph and completing their sleep diary (see Appendix 3.10).
At meeting 3, all participants returned their diaries and actigraph, and 
completed two final sleep anxiety scales (Week Two), and a compliance rating sheet. 
PI participants were asked about their use of the technique, and its general effects. 
Control participants received PI training. All participants were debriefed and thanked, 
and issued with the "Good Sleep Guide" (National Medical Advisory Committee,
1993; see Appendix 3.11). No further treatment was offered.
Insert Table 4.1 here
Results
Participant Characteristics
Demographic summary data are presented in Table 4.1. Chi Square analysis 
indicated participants allocated to the two conditions were equitable in terms of
gender { x 2 = 0.11, df = 1, NS). Independent t-tests also demonstrated participants
did not differ on age (t (32) = 0.63, p  >0.1, NS), duration of sleep problem (t (32) = 
-0.48,/? > 0.1, NS), trait anxiety (/ (32) = 0.01,/? > 0.1, NS), worry (t (32)= 0.09,/? > 
0.1, NS), depression (/ (32)= -0.75,/? > 0.1, NS) or sleep quality (t (32)= 0.63,/? >
0.1, NS).
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Outcome Variables
Unless otherwise indicated, analyses relied on a Two (Condition: Paradoxical 
Intention vs. Control) by Three (Time: Baseline vs. Week One vs. Week Two) 
ANOVA design based on weekly means. Prior to ANOVA, all data were examined 
for kurtosis and skewness and fell within acceptable limits. Data also showed 
homogenous variance, following Hartley's Fmax test (Winer, 1971). Alpha level was 
set at .05, two-tailed, throughout. Means and standard deviations for primary 
outcome variables are presented in Tables 4.2, and 4.3.
Insert Table 4.2 here
Sleep
Objective Sleep (Actigraphy)
Two participants' actigraph data were lost due to faulty equipment. Objective 
sleep analyses are therefore based on 16 participants per condition.
Analyses of variance for objective SOL failed to demonstrate significant 
effects of Time (FI2,60] = 0.48, p  > 0.1, NS) or Condition (FI 130] = 0.06, p  > 0.1, 
NS). The interaction of Time x Condition was also non-significant (FI2,60] = 0.13,p  
>0.1, NS). Objective SOL across conditions remained at approximately 25 - 30 
minutes, with no significant differences between PI and control participants (see 
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2).
Analysis of objective sleep efficiency data failed to reveal significant effects of 
Time (FI2,60] = 0.53, p  > 0.1, NS) or Condition (FI 130] = 0.67, p  > 0.1, NS). The 
interaction of Time x Condition was also non-significant (F[2,60] = 0.19 ,p >  0.1,
NS). Objective efficiency across conditions remained at approximately 80%, with no 
significant differences between PI and control participants (see Figure 4.2 and Table
4.2)
Insert Figure 4.1 here
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Subjective Sleep (Diary)
Analysis revealed a main effect of Time (F[2,64] = 612, p  -  0.002), and an 
interaction of Time x Condition (F[ 2,64] = 9.16 ,p  = 0.0001), displayed graphically in 
Figure 4.3. In order to clarify this interaction, Bonferroni corrected simple main 
effects analyses for Condition were completed across the Time variable (critical p  
value = 0.017; Keppel, 1993). Results indicated PI participants and controls did not 
differ significantly at Baseline (F[133] = 1.15,/? > 0.1, NS), and there was only a 
trend approaching significance for lower SOL amongst PI participants at Week One 
(F[ 133] = 3.36, p  = 0.076) and Week Two (F[133] = 3.34, p  = 0.077). Inspection 
of mean subjective SOL data indicated allocation to PI resulted in a 41.85% reduction 
in SOL, compared to a 1.21% increase amongst controls (see Table 4.2). Subjective 
SOL treatment effect size was "moderate" ( d  = 0.61; cf. Cohen, 1988).
Analysis of subjective sleep efficiency data revealed a main effect of Time 
(F[2,64] = 6.65, p  = 0.024), although the Time x Condition interaction failed to reach 
significance (F[2,64] = 013, p  > 0.1, NS). Analyses for morning restedness data 
also demonstrated a main effect of Time (F[2,64] = 6.97, p  = 0.018), although the 
Time x Condition interaction was non-significant (F[2,64] = 1.55,/? > 0.1, NS).
Insert Figure 4.2 here
The Relationship between Objective and Subjective Sleep Onset Latency
As inspection of Table 4.2 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reveals, objective SOL at 
baseline was 30 minutes for PI participants, and 27 minutes for controls. At Week 
Two, these scores were unchanged for both PI participants (mean = 24 minutes) and 
controls (mean = 25 minutes). No significant objective SOL change following PI 
was therefore observed.
Subjective SOL scores at baseline were much higher than objective SOL 
scores amongst both PI participants (mean = 66 minutes), and controls (mean = 55 
minutes). This suggests participants overestimated SOL relative to actigraphic
75
assessment as an objective criteria. Analyses indicated allocation to PI led to a 
significant reduction in subjective SOL, reducing the discrepancy between subjective 
(mean = 38 minutes) and objective (mean = 24 minutes) SOL scores by Week Two. 
Control subjects showed no significant subjective SOL change, and thus no reduction 
in discrepancy by Week Two (mean subjective SOL = 55 minutes, mean objective 
SOL = 25 minutes). Together, these data suggest, in contrast to hypotheses, 
allocation to PI did not impact on objectively assessed SOL, but did significantly 
reduce participants tendency to overestimate subjective SOL.
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed across all participants to 
examine the association between objective and subjective SOL, and objective and 
subjective sleep efficiency. This revealed correlations were 'low' for SOL (r = 0.25), 
and 'low' for sleep efficiency (r = 0.17).
Insert Table 4.3 here
Sleep Performance Anxiety
Separate ANOVAs were run for the two performance anxiety scales 
employed, based on participants total scale scores at Baseline, Week One and Week 
Two.
Sleep Anxiety Scale (SAS; Fogle & D yall, 1983)
Analysis of variance revealed an effect of Time (7^2,64] = 6.69, p  = 0.002), 
and an interaction of Time x Condition (7*12,64] = 9.84,p  = 0.0001). As is evident in 
Figure 4.4, simple main effects demonstrated no differences across Condition at 
Baseline (7*1133] = 0.09, p  > 0.1, NS). However, at Week Two, PI participants 
displayed significantly lower sleep anxiety than controls (7*1133] = 8.26, p  = 0.007; 
critical p  value = 0.017), and there was a near significant trend for lower sleep anxiety 
at Week One (7*11,33] = 5 A \ ,p  -  0.026; critical p  value = 0.017).
In order to examine the internal consistency of obtained scale data, baseline
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item scores across all participants were subjected to appraisal using Cronbach's alpha. 
This revealed an overall alpha coefficient of 0.86, with the range of alpha values, if 
item deleted, of 0.83 - 0.87. The mean corrected item-total correlation was 0.62.
Insert Figure 4.3 here
Sleep Performance Anxiety Questionnaire (SPAQ; Broomfield & Espie, 2001)
Analysis revealed a main effect of Time (FI 2,64] = 15.68,/? = 0.0001), and a 
Time x Condition interaction (F[2,64] = 15.48,/? = 0.0001), displayed in Figure 4.5. 
As is evident, simple main effects revealed no differences across Condition at 
Baseline (F[133] = 0.30,/? > 0.1, NS), but significantly lower scores for PI 
participants, relative to controls, at Week Two (F[ 133] = 9.89, p  = 0.004; critical p  
value = 0.017), and a near significant trend for lower sleep anxiety amongst PI 
participants at Week One (F[133] = 5.66,/? = 0.023; critical p  value = 0.017).
Cronbach's alpha analysis of baseline item scores revealed an overall alpha 
coefficient of 0.70, with the range of alpha values, if item deleted, of 0.63 - 0.73. The 
mean corrected item total correlation was 0.42.
Finally, pearson correlation coefficients were computed across participants 
baseline scores on the SAS and SPAQ. This indicated correlation was 'moderate' (r 
= 0.62, p  < 0.01), representing 38.5% shared variance.
Insert Figure 4.4 here
The Relationship between Objective and Subjective Sleep Onset Latency 
and Sleep Performance Anxiety
As is evident in Figures 4.1,4.3,4.4. and 4.5, PI significantly reduced sleep 
performance anxiety. Moreover, allocation to PI significantly reduced participants 
subjective SOL, but did not impact on objectively assessed SOL. These data
highlight a possible relationship between sleep anxiety and self-report SOL, whereby
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PI lowered participants sleep anxiety levels, in turn reducing their overestimations of 
time to sleep onset, without actually impacting on objective SOL.
Sleep Effort
Analysis revealed a main effect of Time (F[2,64] = 9.05, p  = 0.0001), and a 
Time x Condition interaction (F[2,64] = 6.37, p  -  0.003). As is evident in Figure 4.6, 
simple main effects indicated PI participants showed significantly lower sleep effort 
at Week One (/ff 133] = 7.72,/? = 0.009; critical p  value = 0.017) and near significant 
lower effort at Week Two (F[133] = 5.55, p  = 0.025; critical p  value = 0.017). No 
differences were observed at Baseline (F[133] = 0.01,/? > 0.1, NS).
Pearson correlational analyses indicated baseline sleep anxiety was 
significantly associated with sleep effort (SAS; r = 0.56, p  = 0.001), (SPAQ; r = 0.58,
p = 0.0001).
Insert Figure 4.5 here
The Association between Sleep Effort, Sleep Performance Anxiety 
and Subjective Sleep Onset Latency
To explore whether reduced sleep effort or sleep anxiety best predicted 
reduced subjective SOL, change scores for each variable (mean week 1 - mean week 
3) were computed and subjected to Pearson correlational analyses. Effort change 
scores were unsuitable for parametric analysis and therefore, Spearman's correlations 
are reported. Results indicated SOL change was significantly associated with sleep 
anxiety change (SAS: r = 0.36,/? = 0.035; SPAQ: r = 0.43,/? = 0.01), but appeared 
more strongly associated with effort change (r = 0.56, p  = 0.001).
Given that sleep effort and sleep anxiety were correlated, partial correlations 
were computed to reveal the individual effect of effort change, and sleep anxiety 
change (both scales), on subjective SOL change. This revealed effort change 
significantly correlated with SOL change when sleep anxiety was partialled out (SAS:
78
rp = 0.42, p  = 0.016; SPAQ: rp = 0.39, p  = 0.026). In contrast, when effort change
was partialled out, neither measure of sleep anxiety was significantly associated with 
SOL change (SAS: rp = 0.08, p > 0.1, NS; SPAQ: rp = 0.2 ,p >  0.1, NS). This
suggests SOL reduction was most strongly associated with sleep effort reduction.
Insert Figure 4.6
Counterdemand Instructions
A series of Two (Instructions: Counterdemand vs. No Counterdemand) by 
Three (Time: Baseline vs. Week One vs. Week Two) ANOVAs on objective and 
subjective SOL and sleep efficiency data revealed no significant effects.
PI: Treatment Credibility, Application, and Reported Effects
PI participants reported a mean rating = 4.70 (SD = 1.10) that "the treatment 
approach seemed sensible", mean = 4.11 (SD = 0.76) that they were "confident it 
would w ork", and mean = 4.64 (SD = 0.86) that they would be "confident in 
recommending it to a friend with insomnia" (all scales 0-6). Note that since controls 
did not receive any formal intervention, no credibility rating data were collected for 
this group.
All 17 PI participants reported they lay awake with their eyes open when 
using PI. None reported using active methods (reading, television) to stay awake.
Twelve participants (70.6%) reported PI helped them get to sleep quicker. 
None reported PI worsened their sleep. Three (17.6%) indicated it made no 
difference to their sleep.
Compliance with Experimental Instructions
Participants reported correctly following experimental instructions (diary
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completion, acti watch use) on mean =19.17 nights. Mean compliance rating (scale 
0-6) was 5.03 (SD = 0.79). Areas of non-adherence included forgetting to press the 
actiwatch, or to replace the actiwatch after wet activities. These events were relatively 
unusual.
Discussion
A first key aim of the study was to examine the effect of PI on objective and 
subjective sleep-onset latency (SOL). Objective SOL differences across condition 
failed to reach statistical significance, with PI participants mean objective SOL 
remaining largely constant relative to baseline. However, PI produced a subjective 
SOL reduction of 41.85% after two weeks, lowering the objective-subjective SOL 
discrepancy (higher subjective SOL) seen at baseline. The subjective SOL treatment 
effect size was "moderate” (cf. Cohen, 1988), with more than two thirds of PI 
participants reporting they fell asleep quicker by the end of the experiment, and none 
indicating it worsened their sleep. Clinically significant interventions are defined as 
those which have a genuine impact on client functioning (Kadzin, 1999), and these 
data suggest clinically significant subjective SOL change following PI was observed. 
Subjective SOL findings therefore appear consistent with previous demonstrations of 
the efficacy of PI (e.g. Ascher & Turner, 1979; Espie et al, 1989), although since only 
PI participants completed a treatment credibility rating, the unbalanced demand 
characteristic between groups may have contributed to this effect.
It is of some importance, however, that in contrast to previous findings (Ott et 
al, 1983), and contrary to our predictions, allocation to PI acted only to lower 
subjective SOL, and did not appear to impact on objective SOL. One possible 
interpretation of this data however is that participants may have overestimated their 
sleep-latency, and that PI acted to ameliorate this overestimation, without impacting 
objective sleep. Research findings have shown that insomniacs do frequently 
overestimate sleep-latency (Borkovec, 1982). Moreover, inspection of Table 4.2
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reveals a clear discrepancy between estimated (subjective) and objective SOL across 
both groups at baseline, with much higher estimated subjective relative to objective 
sleep latency. Interestingly, this objective-subjective SOL discrepancy remained 
amongst control participants at Week 2, but reduced considerably following PI.
Given this, and the lack of objective SOL change across groups, the notion that PI 
acted to reduce SOL overestimation seems credible.
One possible explanation for how PI may have reduced sleep-latency 
overestimation draws on metacognitive models of anxiety disorder (Wells, 1997, 
2001). Metacognitive models of anxiety suggest that beliefs, processes and strategies 
which appraise, monitor or control cognition may be central in the aetiology of 
emotional disorder (Wells, 1997; 2001). Their relevance to sleep seems particularly 
likely, given the key role of pre-sleep intrusions in insomnia, and recent evidence that 
insomniacs employ metacognitive thought control strategies to minimise sleep-related 
intrusions (Harvey, 2000b).
A metacognitive interpretation of the sleep findings relates to a third variable 
recorded during the study - namely sleep anxiety. Research indicates that anxiety and 
worry can incubate intrusive thoughts (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995), and suggests 
that intrusions activate negative meta-cognitive beliefs concerning their meaning and 
significance (see Wells, 1997; 2001). Our analysis indicated that PI significantly 
lowered sleep anxiety. Invoking a metacognitive analysis, by reducing sleep anxiety, 
PI may have reduced the frequency of sleep-related intrusions, in turn lowering 
activation of negative sleep-related metacognitive beliefs (e.g. "Thinking about sleep 
makes my sleep worse"; "Thinking about sleep means I'm a poor sleeper"). This 
lowered activation will have minimised participants catastrophic thoughts and 
perceptions about sleep difficulty, reduced conviction in declarative beliefs about 
sleep ("I'm a poor sleeper"), and shifted their tendency to overestimate sleep latency, 
in the absence of objective sleep improvement (Wells, 2001). In other words, PI 
reduced excessive anxiety about sleep, in turn altering beliefs about sleep via
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metacognitive processes, thereby reducing SOL overestimation. The possible effect 
of lowered sleep anxiety on negative interpretive biases (Williams, Watts, Macleod & 
Mathews, 1997) may also have reduced PI participants tendency to overestimate 
SOL.
Due to the lack of measurement of these variables, this interpretation is 
speculative, although it appears able to account for the reduction in sleep anxiety and 
subjective SOL seen in the absence of objective SOL change. Certainly, the data add 
to growing evidence linking intrusions and metacognitive beliefs (Wells, 2001), and 
suggest insomnia research should take account of metacognitive concepts. Findings 
also highlight the clear similarities between paradoxical directives and anxiety-based 
treatments aimed at metacognitive and behavioural change (e.g. graded exposure, 
exposure plus response prevention).
A competing explanation of the sleep data relates to acti graphic measurement 
error. It is entirely possible that objective and subjective sleep-latency changes 
occurred following PI, but objective changes were not detected actigraphically. 
Although actigraphic measures of sleep duration and total wake time correlate highly 
with PSG data (Mullaney et al, 1980; Sadeh et al, 1995), lower agreement rates for 
discrete variables such as SOL have been reported (Blood et al, 1997; Hauri & 
Wisbey, 1992). This is because actigraphy measures body movements which only 
indirectly reflect sleep (American Sleep Disorders Association, 1995). Quiet 
wakefulness in the pre-sleep phase may therefore have been coded actigraphically as 
’sleep' by the program's algorithm, resulting in the low objective SOL scores observed 
(see Table 4.2). These scores are consistent with previous insomnia studies 
employing actigraphy (Harvey, 2000b; Wicklow & Espie, 2000), and may have 
precluded the likelihood of significant change due to a floor effect. The lack of other 
objective sleep data does however limit this explanation, although the use of such 
measures (e.g. PSG, Behavioural Response Monitoring [BRM]- see Blood et al, 
1997) alongside actigraphy in future PI research may resolve this. Certainly, the low
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correlation between objective and subjective SOL data seen here, and elsewhere (e.g. 
Wicklow & Espie, 2000) suggests these measures reflect differing response systems 
(cf. Wicklow & Espie, 2000), and strengthens the case for recording both in a full 
assessment of sleep.
Certain methodological aspects of the present study may also have reduced 
the likelihood of observing objective SOL change. The present experiment integrated 
a short ’treatment' phase (2 weeks). Whilst objective SOL reduction following brief 
PI has been reported (Ott et al, 1983), a study of longer duration may have 
demonstrated objective SOL effects here. There is also evidence PI delivered by 
trainee clinicians is less likely to result in reduced sleep latency and this may have 
impacted on objective SOL findings (Turner & Ascher, 1982). In addition, only 
thirty-four participants completed the study, four less than were necessaiy for 
adequate power (see Chapter 2). Inclusion of additional participants may have 
increased the likelihood of objective SOL effects. It is certainly likely the lack of 
significant effects observed with respect to counterdemand instructions relates, at least 
in part, to inadequate power. Reliance on a somewhat robust statistical model to avoid 
Type I errors may also have contributed to the sleep data observed.
Importantly, it seems unlikely the sleep findings were confounded by poor 
participant compliance. Participants showed good adherence to the experimental 
protocol, and importantly, all PI participants reported correct employment of 
paradoxical instructions. In addition, in contrast to previous suggestions (Espie & 
Lindsay, 1985), there was no evidence of literal interpretation of paradoxical 
instructions.
The present study also aimed to examine, empirically, the sleep performance 
anxiety model of PI (Ascher & Turner, 1979). As noted, PI participants showed a 
significant reduction in sleep anxiety on both the SAS and SPAQ, which is consistent 
with a previous report (Fogle & Dyall, 1983). In addition, PI participants displayed a 
significant reduction in sleep effort. This indicates they correctly followed PI
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instructions, and suggests successful operationalisation of the sleep effort construct 
in this study.
Moreover, alongside the sleep anxiety data, the observation of significant 
sleep effort reduction confirms the performance anxiety model of PI (Ascher & 
Turner, 1979). Ascher & Turner suggest PI ameliorates initial insomnia by 
eliminating voluntary efforts to sleep, thereby minimising performance anxiety, an 
aroused state incompatible with sleep (Ascher & Turner, 1979). Results here are 
entirely consistent with this model.
By confirming, empirically, Ascher & Turner's performance anxiety model, 
obtained data have clear clinical implications. If PI does operate by reducing sleep 
anxiety and sleep effort, the approach may be best suited to insomniacs high in these 
variables at baseline assessment (Espie & Lindsay, 1985). There is already evidence 
of a link between elevated performance (recursive) anxiety and response to PI in the 
clinical literature (Ascher & Schotte, 1999), and given this, and our finding, research 
should now examine whether insomniacs high in sleep anxiety and sleep effort 
respond better, and more quickly, to interventions integrating PI. This would help 
determine whether PI should be utilised as a general treatment approach, or may be 
best suited to insomniacs with high pre-morbid levels of these variables. The 
operationalisation of both constructs here suggests their routine clinical assessment is 
entirely feasible.
The development of the SPAQ (Broomfield & Espie, 2001) represents an 
important step in improving the operationalisation of sleep anxiety. The scale was 
employed because we felt the SAS (Fogle & Dyall, 1983) fails to measure crucial 
aspects of the construct. The SPAQ comprises seven components of dysfunctional 
sleep monitoring, with items addressing sleep effort, performance failure, sleep 
avoidance and the desire to control sleep, alongside more general measures of 
anxiety/worry about sleeplessness seen in the SAS. Analysis suggested the scale 
shows reasonable internal consistency, and appears to readily distinguish good and
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poor sleepers. Moreover, PI resulted in significant reductions in SPAQ scores.
Clearly, research is necessary to clarify the reliability and validity of the scale, and this
is planned. However, future research must employ scales like the SPAQ to assess
*
more accurately the influence of PI on sleep anxiety.
The sleep anxiety and effort data are also consistent with Wegner's model of 
ironic cognitive control (Wegner, 1994). Wegner suggests that under conditions of 
high cognitive load (e.g. anxiety, stress), the action of the intentional operating system 
is undermined, and the ironic monitor predominates. If sleep anxiety constitutes a 
cognitive load (cf. Ansfield et al, 1996), it follows that sleep anxious insomniacs 
using PI should fall asleep quicker, as their ironic monitor searches for cognitions 
opposing the desired mental state of wakefulness. The present findings appear to 
confirm this, with analysis revealing a strong association between reduced sleep effort 
and reduced subjective SOL. This suggests, for insomniacs high in sleep anxiety, 
sleep-onset was promoted when attempts were made to stay awake. In other words, 
under high cognitive load, PI resulted in the ironic monitoring process detecting 
restful cognitions, thereby promoting faster sleep-onset (cf. Ansfield et al, 1996; 
Wegner, 1994).
It should finally be noted that our analysis did not reveal any significant 
subjective or objective sleep efficiency differences following PI. Previous findings 
regarding PI and sleep efficiency are ambiguous though (Fogle & Dyall, 1983), and 
there is little evidence to suggest PI increases total sleep time, a closely related 
variable (see e.g. Ascher & Turner, 1979; Espie et al, 1989). Thus, it still remains 
unclear whether PI influences sleep efficiency. The approach instructs clients to give 
up effort to sleep at the point of sleep-onset (Ascher & Turner, 1980). Therefore, PI 
may primarily impact SOL.
In summary, following PI, there was evidence of subjective SOL and sleep 
anxiety reduction, but no evidence of objective SOL reduction. One explanation of 
this data is that by lowering sleep anxiety, PI reduced activation of negative
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metacognitive beliefs, thus minimising SOL overestimation (cf. Wells, 2001). 
Alternatively, the lack of objective SOL change may relate to the insensitivity of 
actigraphy, although this seems less likely. The demonstration of significant sleep 
effort reduction amongst PI participants, alongside the sleep anxiety data, certainly 
offers empirical clarification of the performance anxiety model of PI (Ascher & 
Turner, 1979), and these results are also consistent with Wegner's model of ironic 
cognitive control (Wegner, 1994). Research is now required to explore further the 
link between these underlying putative mechanisms and response to PI, and to extend 
progress made here in operationalising these constructs. This will have important 
implications for the future clinical application of PI in managing chronic initial 
insomnia.
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Figure 4.1 Mean and standard error objective sleep onset latency 
for paradoxical intention and control subjects, as a 
function of Time.
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Figure 4.2 Mean and standard error objective sleep efficiency 
for paradoxical intention and control subjects, as a 
function of Time.
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of Time.
T
on
Sle
ep
 
A
nx
ie
ty
101
Paradoxical Intention
A  Control
17-
16-
1 5 -
14-
13-
12 -
Baseline . Week One Week Two
Tim e
Figure 4.4 Mean and standard error sleep anxiety scores on
the SAS for paradoxical intention and control subjects, 
as a function of Time.
Sle
ep
 
A
nx
ie
ty
102
— □—  Paradoxical Intention 
 & Control
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 
12 
1 1  
10 
9
Baseline Week One Week Two
Time
Figure 4.5 . Mean and standard error sleep anxiety scores on the 
SPAQ for paradoxical intention and control subjects, 
as a function of Time.
l-------------------------------- 1-------------------------------- r
Sle
ep
 
Ef
fo
rt
103
— □---- Paradoxical Intention
3
2.5 
2
1-5 
]
0.5 
0
Baseline Week One Week Two
Time
Figure 4.6 Mean and standard error sleep effort ratings for 
paradoxical intention and control subjects, as a 
function of Time.
A  Control
104
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Abstract
This study tested the effectiveness of Structured Relapse Prevention (SRP) in the 
treatment of alcohol dependence and comorbid panic disorder. A single case 
experimental design was employed. Consistent with previous research, daily self-report 
and questionnaire data demonstrated SRP significantly reduced alcohol intake, 
increased client self-efficacy, and promoted abstinence. The association between 
problem drinking and comorbid anxiety disorder was also examined. Problem drinking 
may promote anxiety disorder, and consistent with this, panic attack frequency and daily 
anxiety rating data indicated that, following abstinence, criteria for panic disorder were 
not met. However, residual avoidance and safety behaviours (carrying alcohol to prevent 
panic attack) remained, which were subsequently treated using cognitive-behavioural 
methods. In particular, graded exposure involving the dropping of carrying alcohol 
achieved some change in associated beliefs, although this was non-significant. Together, 
findings underline the complex association between alcohol dependence and anxiety
disorder, and indicate the need for further single-case and group research in this area.
Keywords: Alcohol Dependence, Relapse Prevention, Self-Efficacy, Controlled Drinking, 
Comorbid Panic Disorder, Safety Behaviours,
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Appendix 1: Small Scale Service Evaluation
Appendix 1.1
N o te s  f o r  C o n t r i b u t o r s
P a p e r s ,  a r t i c l e s  a n d  o th e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  s h o u ld  be  se n t  to  th e  E d i to r ,  Health Bulletin , 
Sco t t ish  E x ecu t iv e  Heal th  D ep a r tm en t .  R o o m  IE05. St A n d r e w ’s H ouse ,  E d in b u rg h  EH1 
3 D E .  T h e y  m u s t  b e  s u b m i t t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  fo r  Health Bulletin.  A c c e p ta n c e  is on  th e  
u n d e r s t a n d in g  tha t  e d i to r ia l  r ev is io n  m a y  be n ec e s sa ry .  A l l  p a p e r s  a re  r e v i e w e d  by  the  
E d ito r  an d  by p e e r  rev iew ,  re fe rees  b e in g  d raw n  f rom  a pane l  o f  ap p rop r ia te  p rofess ionals .  
N o  c o r re s p o n d e n c e  can  be en te red  into in re la t ion  to a r t ic le s  fo u n d  to be unsu i tab le  and  
re tu rned  to authors.
P o t e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  c a n  b e  s u b m i t t e d  in  t w o  w a y s .  M a t e r i a l  s u b m i t t e d  f o r  
p u b l i c a t i o n  m u s t  b e  t y p e w r i t t e n  o n  o n e  s id e  o f  th e  p a p e r  o n ly ,  in d oub le  spa c ing  an d  
with ad e q u a te  m arg in s ,  and  each  p ag e  shou ld  be n u m b e re d .  T h e  top  typed co p y  shou ld  be  
su bm it ted ,  w i th  f o u r  o th e r  c o p ie s .  W e  a re  w i l l in g  to  r e c e iv e  o n e  c o p y  ty p e w r i t t e n  in th e  
a b o v e  f o rm a t  a n d  a c c o m p a n i e d  by  a  d i s k  ( M ic r o s o f t  W o r d  v e r s io n  98 ,  E x c e l  f o r  ta b le s  
an d  f i g u r e s ) .  A l l  p a p e r s  s h o u l d  be  p r e f a c e d  b y  a  s t r u c t u r e d  A b s t r a c t ,  o f  a b o u t  2 5 0  
w o r d s  in l e n g t h .  It  s h o u l d  n o r m a l l y  c o n t a i n  s ix  c l e a r l y  h e a d e d  s e c t i o n s  e n t i t l e d  
O b je c t iv e ,  D e s ig n ,  S e t t in g .  S u b je c t s ,  R e su l t s  a n d  C o n c lu s i o n .  T h e  na m e ,  a p p o in tm e n t  
and  p la c e  o f  w o r k  o f  the a u th o rs  sh o u ld  be  s u p p l ie d  on a  s e p a ra te  ti tle page .  T h is  sa m e  
p ag e  sh o u ld  in c lu d e  the full pos ta l  a d d re s s  o f  o n e  a u th o r ,  to  w h o m  co rre sp o n d e n c e  a n d  
reprin ts  will  be  d irec ted .  T h e re  shou ld  be  ad eq u a te  r e fe ren ce s  to  any  re levan t  p rev io u s  w o rk  
on the  subjec t;  these  re fe rences  shou ld  a p p e a r  at the e n d  o f  the  m aterial  on  a se pa ra te  p age  
o r .pages ,  us ing  the V a n c o u v e r  style , w h ich  in the case  o f  p a p e r s  in jo u rn a l s  inc ludes :
S u rn a m e  and  initials o f  au tho r(s )
T it le  o f  p a p e r  
Full n am e  o f  jo u rn a l  
Y e a r  pub l i sh ed  
V o lu m e  n u m b e r
O p e n in g  and  c lo s in g  page  n u m b e rs
R e fe ren ce  to b o o k s  should  sim ilar ly  inc lude  a u th o r ’s nam e  an d  initials,  full title, ed i t ion  ( if  
necessa ry) ,  p lace  o f  pub l ica t ion ,  p u b l i s h e r ' s  n am e,  y ear  and .  if  requ ired ,  vo lu m e  n u m b er ,  
c h a p te r  n u m b e r  o r  page num ber .
S h o r t  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s .  Health Bulletin pub l ishes  short  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  (not e x c e e d in g  
four  p a g e s  in leng th )  as  a se para te  se c t ion ,  and  w e  a im  to o f fe r  sp e e d ie r  p u b l ica t ion  fo r  
these. M a te r ia l  in ten d ed  for this sec t ion  shou ld  be  su b m i t te d  in the ab o v e  fo rm ,  and the 
co v e r in g  letter  sh o u ld  state the intention .
C o p y r i g h t .  T h e  material  in Health Bulletin is c opyr igh t .  I te m s  m ay  be freely  r e p ro d u c e d  
in p r o f e s s i o n a l  j o u r n a l s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  s u i t a b l e  a c k n o w l e d g m e n t  is m a d e  a n d  t h a t  
r e p r o d u c t i o n  is n o t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  a n y  fo rm  o f  a d v e r t i s i n g  m a te r ia l .  In o t h e r  c a s e s ,  
p e r m i s s i o n  to  r e p r o d u c e  e x t r a c t s  s h o u l d  b e  s o u g h t  t h r o u g h  th e  E d i t o r  f r o m  H M S O  
(C o p y r ig h t  S ec t io n )  w h ich  con tro ls  the copyr igh t .
P ro o f s
C o n t r ib u to r s  w il l  r e c e iv e  o n e  se t  o f  p ro o fs .  T h is  s h o u ld  b e  r ead  c a r e fu l ly  fo r  p r i n te r ’s 
errors ,  and  any  tables ,  f igures and  leg en d s  shou ld  be  ch e c k e d .  A lte ra t ions  shou ld  be  kep t  to 
a m in im u m ,  and  the proofs shou ld  be r e tu rn ed  p rom ptly .
R e p r i n t s
Ten  reprin ts  will  be  supp l ied  free o f  charge .
Appendix 1.2
LOMOND AND ARGYLL PRIMARY CARE NHS TRUST 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOG Y SERVICE '
. AUDIT OF NEW REFERRALS
psychology No. 
Date of Birth
O pt in: Y E S/N O
Sex
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Age: 15 or under C 
16-64  A
65 or over E
Neuro N
Physical Health PH__
GP Name
Date Referral Received
Date of Last Appointment Offered 
No. o f Times Attended 1 I
Practice Code f
Date o f First Appointment Offered
Tick if Medico-legal report □
No. of UTA’s I 1 No. ofDNA’s L
Location For First Appointment
1. Joint Hospital --- 7. Victoria Infirmary
2. Clyde Unit, Joint Hospital 8. Out-patient Clinic, VOLDGH
3. Geriatric Day Unit, Joint Hospital 9. Ward, VOLDGH
4. Cottage Hospital 10. Christie Ward
5, Dumbarton Health Centre 11. Home Visit
6. Bank St 12. O ther:
Referred By (Profession/Agency)
1. Clinical Psychologist
2. Educational Psychologist
3. Psychiatrist (name)______
4. GP
5. Social Worker
6. Health Visitor
7. Occupational Therapist
8. Medical Consultant —
. . 9. Voluntary Agency
_ 10. Community Team
11. Speech Therapist
12. HMS Neptune
— 13. Other —
--
Psychologist Other Agencies Involved
1. Daryl Foot
2. Elizabeth Irvine
3. Ishbel Dumughn
Trainee/Assistant
1. Trainee
2. Assistant B
Choose up to 4 categories
1. CPN
2. Psychiatry
3. Social Work 
4 OT
5. Counsellor
6. Voluntary Sector
7. Other:_______________
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Appendix 1.3
EPP1C reason for care categories
Anxiety and Phobias
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
Anger
Depression/Mood Disorder 
Obsessional Disorder 
Eating Disorder 
Sleep Disorder 
Personality Disorder 
Behavioural/Movement Disorder 
Addictions
Cognitive/Development/Speech Disorder 
Poblems related to Physical Illness 
Sexual Disorder 
Elimination
Relationship/Social Problems
Additional categories taken from EPPIC contributory factors
Abuse/Trauma 
Psychiatric Illness
I l l
Appendix 1.4
The proportion of agreement for each EPPIC category was calculated by dividing the 
number of instances that the GP and the Psychologist agreed (Total no. of agreements), 
by the sum of that figure and the number of instances when the GP and Psychologist did 
not agree (Total no. of Disagreements). For reference see e.g., (15). The total number of 
disagreements per category constituted aH occasions when the GP referred for the 
category in question but the Psychologist treated for a differing problem, and those 
occasions when the Psychologist treated for a category in question but the GP referred 
for a different problem. These data can be read off in Table 2. Proportions for each 
category were then expressed in percentage form.
% Agreement per
category = Total no. of Agreements
Total no. of Agreements + Total no. of Disagreements x 100/1%
Depression
Relationship/Social
Cognitive/Development/Speech Di sorder 
Anger
Eating Disorder
Behaviour/Movement Disorder
Abuse/Trauma
Physical health
Sexual Dysfunction
Personality Disorder
Psychiatric Illness
Addictions
Sleep Disorder
Unstated/other
Anxiety
OCD
PTSD
106/196 x 100% = 54.08% 
3/6 x 100% = 50.00%
7/17 x 100%= 41.18% 
45/106 x 100% = 42.25% 
16/75 x 100%= 21.33% 
7/15 x 100% = 46.67% 
5/18 x 100% = 27.78% 
13/19 x 100%= 68.42% 
2/7 x 100% = 28.57% 
24/40 x 100% = 60.00% 
5/11 x 100% = 45.45% 
5/10 x 100% = 50.00%
0/3 x 100% = 0.00%
0/2  x 100% = 0 .00%
0/4 x 100% = 0.00%
1/4 x 100% = 25.00%
0/16 x 100% = 0 .00%
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Appendix 2.1
Major Project Research proposal guidelines from D.Clin.Psy Course 
Handbook.
The research proposal should be laid out according to the format described below. This 
format is based upon the application for a mini-project grant in Health Services Research 
(SOHHD- Chief Scientist Office). Trainees may find that forms provided by ethical 
committees are substantially similar to this and this may be an acceptable alternative 
format.
1.1 Applicants
Names and addresses including the names of co-workers and supervisors) if known.
1.2 Title
No more than 15 words.
1.3 Summary
Of less than 300 words, including a reference to where the study will be carried out.
1.4 Introduction
Of less than 600 words summarising previous work in the field, drawing attention to 
gaps in present knowledge and stating how the project will add to knowledge and 
understanding.
1.5 Aims and hypotheses
These should wherever possible be stated as a list of questions to be answered to which 
answers will be sought.
1.6 Plan of investigation
Consisting of a statement of the practical details of how it is proposed to obtain answers 
to the questions posed.
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1.6.1 Subjects
A brief statement of inclusion and exclusion criteria and anticipated number of 
participants.
1.6.2 Measures:
A brief explanation of interviews/observations/rating scales etc. to be employed, 
including references where appropriate
1.6.3 Design and procedure
A brief explanation of the overall experimental design with reference to comparisons to 
be made, control populations, timing of measurements, etc. A summary chart may be 
helpful to explain the research process.
1.6.4 Settings and equipment
A statement on the location(s) to be used and resources or equipment which will be 
employed (if any).
1.6.5 Data analysis
A brief explanation of how data will be collected, stored, and analysed.
1.7 Practical Applications
The applicants should state the practical use to which the research findings could be put.
1.8 Timescales
The proposed starting date and duration of the project.
1.9 Ethical Approval
Stating whether this is necessary and, if so, whether it has been obtained.
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Appendix 2.2
Name
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index 
_______  D ate___________  ID No
Instructions:
The following questions relate to your usual sleep habits during the past month 
only .Yours answers should indicate the most accurate reply for the majority of days and 
nights in the past month.
Plase answer all of the questions.
1. During the past month, when have you usually gone to bed at night?
USUAL BED TIM E_____________
2. During the past month, how long (in minutes) has it taken you to fall asleep each 
night?
NUMBER OF M INUTES_____________
3. During the past month, when have you usually got up in the morning?
USUAL GETTING UP T IM E ___________
4. During the past month, how many hours actual sleep did you get at night (this may be 
different than the number of hours you spend in bed).
HOURS OF SLEEP PER N IG H T____________
For each of the remaining questions, check the one best response. Please answer all the 
questions.
5. During the past month, how often have you had trouble sleeping because you
(a) Cannot get to sleep within 30 minutes 
Not during the Less than once Once or twice
past m onth  a week ____  a w e e k ____
Three or more 
times a week
(b) Wake up in the middle of the night or early morning 
Not during the Less than once Once or twice 
past m onth  a week ____
(c) Have to get up to use the bathroom 
Not during the Less than once
past m onth  a week ____
(d) Cannot breathe comfortably 
Not during the Less than once
past m onth  a week ____
(e) Cough or snore loudly
Not during the Less than once
past m onth  a week ____
a week
Once or twice 
a w e e k ____
Once or twice 
a w e e k ____
Once or twice 
a week
Three or more 
times a week
Three or more 
times a week
Three or more 
times a week
Three or more 
times a week
(f) Feel too cold
Not during the Less than once Once or twice Three or more
past m onth  a w e e k   a w e e k   times a week _
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(g) Feel too hot 
Not during the 
past m onth___
(h) Had bad dreams 
Not during the 
past m onth____
(I) Have pain 
Not during the 
past m onth____
Less than once 
a week
Less than once 
a week ____
Less than once 
a week
Once or twice 
a week
Once or twice 
a w e e k ____
Once or twice 
a week
Three or more 
times a week
Three or more 
times a week
Three or more 
times a week
(j) Other reason(s), please describe
6 . During the past month, how would you rate your sleep quality overall?
Very good ________
Fairly good ________
Fairly bad ________
Very bad _________
7. During the past month, how often have you taken medicine (prescribed or “over the 
counter”) to help you sleep?
Not during the Less than once Once or twice Three or more
past m onth  a w e e k   a w e e k   times a w eek____
8 . During the past month, how often have you had trouble staying awake while, driving, 
eatings meals, or engaging in social activity?
Not during the Less than once Once or twice Three or more
past m onth  a week ____  a w e e k   times a w eek____
9. During the past month, how much of a problem has it been for you to keep up enough 
enthusiasm to get things done?
Not a problem at all_______________
Only slight problem ______
Somewhat of a problem ______
A very big problem ______
10. Do you have a bed partner or roommate?
No bed partner or roommate ______
Partner/roomate in other room ______
Partner in same room, but not same bed ______
Partner in same bed ______
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Appendix 2.3 The Sleep History Questionnaire
No Mild Moderate Severe
No Mild Moderate Severe
No Mild Moderate Severe
No Mild Moderate Severe
1. Nature of Sleep-Wake problem
Do you have a problem with falling asleep? 
Do you have a problem with staying asleep? 
Do you have a problem with waking up too 
early in the morning?
Do you have a problem with staying 
awake during the day?
2. Current Sleep-Wake Schedule
What is your usual bedtime on weekdays ?_______________ __________
At what time do you last awaken in the morning?__________ __________
What is your usual rising time on weekdays?_____________ __________
Do you have the same sleep-wake schedule on weekends? YES NO
How often do you take naps (including unintentional naps)? _________
Do you ever fall asleep at inappropriate times/places? YES NO
How many nights/week do you have a problem with
falling asleep/staying awake? _________
o’clock
o’clock
o ’clock
days/week
nights
On a typical night (past month), how long does it take 
you to fall asleep after you go to bed & turn the lights off? 
On a typical night (past month) how many times do you 
wake up during the middle of the night?
hours mm
times
What wakes you up at night? Pain Child Noise Spontaneous
On a typical night, how long do you spend awake 
in the middle of the night (total no. of min/hrs for all 
wakenings)?
How many hours of sleep per night do you usually get ?
hours
hours
min
min
3. Sleeping Aids
In the past 4 weeks have you used sleeping pills? YES NO
Which drugs?
Which dosage?
How many nights/week?
If no, have you ever?
When did you first use sleep medication?
When did you last use sleep medication?
In the past 4 weeks have you used alcohol as a sleep aid? YES NO
If no, have you ever? YES NO
4. History of Sleep Problems (onset, course, duration) 
How long have you been suffering from insomnia? 
Were there any stressful life events related to it’s onset
years months
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(e.g. death of a loved one, divorce, retirement, medical 
or emotional problems etc)?
Gradual or sudden onset?
What has been the course of your insomnia problem since 
it’s onset (e.g. persistent, episodic, seasonal etc)?
5. Bedroom Environment
Are you sleeping with a bed partner? YES NO
Do you have a TV, radio, phone in your bedroom? YES NO
Is there a desk with paperwork to be done in the room? YES NO
Do you read in bed before bedtime? YES NO
What is your room temperature at night? Hot Warm Cool Cold
6 . Lifestyle
How many times per week do you exercise?_____________________ times per week
Do you sometimes exercise prior to bedtime? YES NO
How many caffeinated drinks do you drink per day? _______ per day
How many cigarettes per day do you smoke? _______ per day
How many units of alcohol per day do you drink?________________  per day
7. General
What is your pre-bedtime routine like?
What do you do when you can’t fall asleep, or return to sleep?
Is your sleep better/worse/same when you go away from home?
Is your sleep better/worse/same on weekends?
What types of factors exacerbate your sleep problem (e.g. stress at work, travel plan etc)? 
What types of factors improve your sleep?
How concerned are you about sleep/insomnia?
What impact does insomnia have on your life (e.g. mood, alertness, performance)?
How do you cope with these daytime sequelae?
Have you received treatment in the past other than sleeping aids?
If you would like to add any further information that you think would be relevant, then 
please do so in the space provided below.
Thank-you.
9Ref: AmcM/0016
GREATER GLASGOW 
PRIMARY CARE 
NHSTRUST
3 August, 2000
Dr N Broomfield 
Academic Centre 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital 
1055 Gt Western Road 
Glasgow 
G12OXH
Dear Dr Broomfield
PROJECT: Insomnia and paradoxical intention -  an experimental investigation using
a digraph ic measurement of sleep
Many thanks for sending the required amendments for the above named submission to the 
Research Ethics Committee. I am pleased to be able to tell you that the Committee has no 
objections from an ethical point of view, to this project proceeding and ethical approval is formally 
granted.
Before your project commences you will also require to obtain management approval via the 
Research & Development Directorate, Gartnavel Royal Hospital.
! would also like to take this opportunity to remind you that you should notify the Committee if 
there are any changes, or untoward developments, connected with the study -  the Committee 
would then require-to further reconsider your application for approval. The Committee expect to 
receive a brief regular update every 6 months, and then a brief final report on your project when 
the study reaches its conclusion. (Failure to keep the Committee abreast of the status of the 
project can eventually lead to ethical approval being withdrawn).
May. I wish you every success with your study.
Yours sincerely
A W McMAHON
Administrator -  Research Ethics Committee
D645907
Trust Headquarters Gartnavel Royal Hospital 1055 Great Western Road Glasgow G12 OXH Tel: 0141 211 3600
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BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH AND THERAPY 
Appendix 3.1 i n c o r p o r a t i n g  B E H A V I O R A L  A S S E S S M E N T
Information fo r  Contributors
Subm ission  o f  Papers
A uthors are requested to subm it their original m anuscrip t and figures with tw o copies. M anuscrip ts  for 
the regular section should be sent to  D r S. Rachm an, D epartm ent o f  Psychology. University o f  B ritish  C olum bia, 
V ancouver, British Colum bia, C anada, V6T IZ4. M anuscrip ts  for the Behavioral A ssessm en t S ection  should  be 
sen t to Dr S. T aylor, D epartm ent o f  Psychiatry, 2255 W esbrook mall, V ancouver, British C o lum bia , C anada, 
V 6T  2 A I.
Subm ission  o f  a paper im plies that it has not been  published  previously, that it is not under consideration  for 
pub lication  elsew here , and that if  accepted  it will not be published  e lsew here in the sam e form , in E nglish  o r  in 
any  o ther language, w ithout the w ritten  consent o f the  publisher.
M a nuscrip t Preparation
G e n e ra l:  M anuscripts m ust be typew ritten, doub le-spaced  with wide m argins on one side o f  w h ite  paper. 
G ood  quality  printouts with a font size  o f  12 o r 10 pt are required . T he corresponding author shou ld  be identified 
(inc lude  a Fax num ber and E-m ail address). Full postal addresses m ust be g iven for all co-authors. A u thors shou ld  
consu lt a recent issue o f  the jo u rn a l for style if  possible. A n electronic  copy o f  the paper should accom pany  the 
final version. The Editors reserve the right to adjust sty le  to  certain  standards o f  uniform ity. A uthors shou ld  reta in  
a copy o f  their m anuscript since we cannot accept responsib ility  for dam age o r loss o f papers. O rig inal m anuscrip ts  
are d iscarded  one m onth after publication  unless the Pub lisher is asked to return original m aterial a fter use.
A b s tra c ts :  A sum m ary, not exceeding  200 w ords, should  be subm itted on a separate sheet in duplicate. T he  
sum m ary  will appear at the beginning  o f the article.
K ey w o rd s : A uthors should include up to six keyw ords with their article. K eyw ords should be selected  from  
the APA list o f index descrip tors, unless otherw ise agreed  with the Editor.
T e x t: F ollow  this order when typing m anuscripts: T itle , A uthors, Affiliations, Abstract. K eyw ords. M ain tex t. 
A cknow ledgem ents, A ppendix, R eferences, Vitae, F igure C ap tions and then Tables. D o not im port the F igures or 
T ab les into your text. T he co rresponding  author shou ld  be identified with an asterisk  and footnote. All o th er 
foo tno tes (except for table footnotes) should Be. identified w ith superscript A rabic num bers.
R e fe re n c e s : All publications c ited  in the text should  be present in a list of references follow ing the text o f  
the m anuscrip t. In the text refer to the au th o r's  name (w ithou t initials) and year of publication, e.g. "S in ce  P eterson  
(1993) has show n that . . ." o r “This is in agreem ent w ith results obtained later (K ram er. 1994)''. F o r 2 - 6  au thors, 
all au thors are to be listed at first c itation, with separating  the last tw o authors For m ore than  six au thors, 
use the first six authors follow ed by e t al. In subsequent c ita tions for three or m ore authors use au thor et al. in 
the text. The list o f  references should  be arranged a lphabetically  by authors ' names. The m anuscript should  be 
carefu lly  checked to ensure that the spelling o f  au thors nam es and dates are exactly the same in the text as in the 
reference list,
R eferences should be prepared carefully  using the P ublication M anual o f  the A m erican  P sych o lo g ica l A sso c i­
a tion  for style as follovfs:
B irbaum er, N „ G erber, D.. M iltner, W ., Lutzenberger, W „ & K luck, M. (1984). Start with b iofeedback and co n tin u e  
w ith behav io r therapy in m igraine. Proceedings o f  the 15th A n nua l M eeting o f  Biofeedback Societ\ o f  A m erica  
(pp. 3 3 -3 6 ) A lbuquerque.
G ray, J.A . (1976). The behavioral inhibition system: a possible substratum  for anxiety. In M. P. Feldm an & A. 
Broadhurst. Theoretica l and  experim en ta l bases o f  the behaviour therapies  (pp. 3 -4 1 ). L ondon: W iley.
T aber, 1.1., M cC orm ick, R.A ., Russo, A .M .. A dkins, B.J., & Ram irez, L.F. (1987). Follow -up o f  pathological 
gam blers after treatm ent. A m erican  Journa l o f  Psychiatry, 144, 757-761 .
I l lu s tra tio n s :  All illustrations should  be provided in cam era-ready form, suitable for reproduction (w hich m ay 
include reduction) without retouching .. Photographs, charts and d iagram s are all to be referred to as 'F ig u re (s ) '' 
and should  be num bered consecutively  in the order to w hich they are referred. They should accom pany the m an u ­
script. but should  not be included w ithin the text. All illustrations should be clearly m arked on the back  w ith 
the figure num ber and the a u th o r 's  nam e. All figures are to have a caption. Captions should be supplied  on a 
separate sheet. •
Line draw ings:  Good quality  printouts on white paper p roduced in black ink are required. All lettering , graph 
lines and points on graphs should be sufficiently large and bold to perm it reproduction when the diagram  has been 
reduced  to a size suitable for inclusion in the journal. D ye-line prints or photocopies are not su itab le  for rep ro ­
duction. Do not use any type o f  shading  on com puter-generated  illustrations.
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Appendix 3.2 
Sleep Diarv
Initials: Date:
What time did you get up this morning? ________________
What time did you go to bed last night? ________________
How long did it take you to fall asleep (minutes)? ________________
How many times did you awaken during the night? ________________
How many times were you awake for longer than 10 minutes? ________________
How long were you awake during the night in total ?______________________________
How long did you sleep altogether (hours/minutes)? ________________
When I went to bed last night,
I tried really hard to get to sleep 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all very much
When I woke up this morning,
I felt rested 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all very much
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Appendix 3.3
Sleep Anxiety Scale
Please complete the following questions regarding your sleep for a typical night 
in the last week. Indicate your answer by circling one of the options on the 
scale outlined.
1. Forme, having difficulty 
falling asleep initially at 
night is a major worry a minor worry not a worry
2. For me, having difficulty 
getting back to sleep after 
waking at night is a major worry a minor worry not a worry
3. For me, waking up too 
early in the morning is a major worry a minor worry not a worry
4. For me, not feeling 
rested the next day is a major worry a minor worry not a worry
Now, please complete the following questions regarding your worries about not 
sleeping. Again, please indicate your answer by circling one of the options on 
the scale outlined.
1. When I go to bed, my
sleeplessness worries me very much some not at all
2. When I wake up at night,
my sleeplessness worries me very much some not at all
3. When I wake up early in the 
morning, my sleeplessness
worries me very much some not at all
4. When I think about it during 
the day, my sleeplessness
worries me very much some not at all
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Appendix 3.4
Sleep Performance Anxiety Questionnaire
The following seven statements relate to your night-time sleep pattern in the past week. 
Please indicate by circling one response how true each statement is for you.
1. I put too much effort into sleeping at night when it should come naturally
Very much To some extent Not at all
2. I feel I should be able to control my sleep at night
Very much To some extent Not at all
3. I put off going to bed at night for fear of not being able to sleep
Very much To some extent Not at all
4. I worry about not sleeping if I am in bed at night and cannot sleep
Very much To some extent Not at all
5. I am no good at sleeping at night
Very much To some extent Not at all
6 . I get anxious about sleeping before I go to bed at night
Very much To some extent Not at all
7. I worry about the long term consequences of not sleeping at night
Very much To some extent Not at all
Thank-you.
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Appendix 3.5 
Credibility Rating Sheet
1. How sensible does this treatment seem to you?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all very much
2. How confident are you that this treatment will work for you?
0 1 2 3 4  5 6
not at all very much
3. How confident would you be in recommending this treatment to a friend who suffers 
from insomnia?
0 1 2 3 4  5 6
not at all very much
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Appendix 3.6 
Compliance Rating Sheet
1. To what extent did you comply with the experimental instructions (diary completion, 
wearing actiwatch, pressing button on actiwatch) given to you during the study ?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all very much
2. Please estimate how many of the 21 nights you correctly followed the experimental 
procedure (diary completion, wearing actiwatch, pressing button on actiwatch)?
__________ nights
3. Please comment on any areas of non-compliance:
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Appendix 3.8 
Instructions
Often, people who find sleeping difficult are so eager to fall asleep that they try too hard.
Unfortunately, sleep is a natural process which happens involuntarily. So you cannot
make yourself fall asleep- it must happen naturally. And since sleep is involuntary, 
trying too hard to get to sleep will always fail. This can cause worry about not being able 
to sleep, which in turn makes trying to sleep even more difficult.
So, the more you try to control sleep, the less you are likely to get to sleep. This then 
makes you more worried about not sleeping, and in turn your sleep problem gets even 
worse. So by giving up trying to sleep, your sleep pattern should improve.
Therefore, in this experiment, we want you to give up trying to fall asleep when you go to 
bed. Instead, we want you to try to stay awake. Paradoxically, staying awake should 
help you get to sleep more quickly because it stops you worrying, and it stops you 
trying. So, for the next 14 nights, give up trying to sleep and instead, try to stay awake. 
Here's how to do it.
1. As you go to bed tonight, lie down in a comfortable position and put the lights out.
2. In the darkened room, try to stay awake with your eyes open. Each time they feel like 
closing tell yourself "it would be good to keep them open for another little while".
3. Congratulate yourself on your success at remaining awake. Remind yourself that 
staying awake will help you get to sleep quicker.
4. If at any stage you feel worried or irritable at not sleeping remind yourself "the plan is 
to remain awake so I'm doing fine."
5. Try to stay awake as long as you can.
6 . Do not, however, use active methods to stay awake such as reading or physical 
movement. The idea is to resist sleep-onset gently but persistently.
Remember, the above instructions take time to have an effect on your sleep. Patience and 
perseverance are essential. Do not expect to see any improvement during Week 1 of the 
experiment, but by the beginning of Week 2 you will begin to see dramatic 
improvements, and you will be relaxing yourself to sleep.
Please continue to wear your actigraph wristwatch and complete your sleep dairies for the
next 14 nights. Good luck.
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Appendix 3.9 
Instructions
Often, people who find sleeping difficult are so eager to fall asleep that they try too hard.
Unfortunately, sleep is a natural process which happens involuntarily. So you cannot
make yourself fall asleep- it must happen naturally. And since sleep is involuntary, 
trying too hard to get to sleep will always fail. This can cause worry about not being able 
to sleep, which in turn makes trying to sleep even more difficult.
So, the more you try to control sleep, the less you are likely to get to sleep. This then 
makes you more worried about not sleeping, and in turn your sleep problem gets even 
worse. So by giving up trying to sleep, your sleep pattern should improve.
Therefore, in this experiment, we want you to give up trying to fall asleep when you go to 
bed. Instead, we want you to try to stay awake. Paradoxically, staying awake should 
help you get to sleep more quickly because it stops you worrying, and it stops you 
trying. So, for the next 14 nights, give up trying to sleep and instead, try' to stay awake. 
Here's how to do it.
1. As you go to bed tonight, lie down in a comfortable position and put the lights out.
2. In the darkened room, try to stay awake with your eyes open. Each time they feel like 
closing tell yourself "it would be good to keep them open for another little while".
3. Congratulate yourself on your success at remaining awake. Remind yourself that 
staying awake will help you get to sleep quicker.
4. If at any stage you feel worried or irritable at not sleeping remind yourself "the plan is 
to remain awake so I'm doing fine."
5. Try to stay awake as long as you can.
6 . Do not, however, use active methods to stay awake such as reading or physical 
movement. The idea is to resist sleep-onset gently but persistently.
Remember, with patience and perseverance, the above instructions should have an 
immediate effect on your sleep. You will begin to see immediate and dramatic 
improvements as soon as you start to follow these instructions, and begin to relax 
yourself to sleep.
Please continue to wear your actigraph wristwatch and complete your sleep dairies for the
next 14 nights. Good luck.
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Appendix 3.10 
Instructions
In order for us to understand sleep problems in more detail, we want you to continue to 
wear your actigraph wristwatch and complete your sleep dairies.
Thank you.
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Appendix 3.11 THE GOOD SLEEP GUIDE
During the evening
1. Put the day to rest. Think it through. Tie up "loose ends" in your mind and plan 
ahead. A notebook may help.
2. Take some light exercise early in the evening. Generally try to keep yourself fit.
3. Wind down during the course of the evening. Do not do anything that is mentally 
demanding within 90 minutes of bedtime.
4. Do not sleep or doze in the armchair. Keep your sleep for bedtime.
5. Do not drink too much coffee or tea and only have a light snack for supper. Do not 
drink alcohol to aid your sleep- it usually upsets sleep.
6 . Make sure your bed and bedroom are comfortable- not too cold and not too warm.
At Bedtime
1. Go to bed when you are "sleepy tired" and not before.
2. Do not read or watch TV in bed. Keep these activities for another room.
3. Set the alarm for the same time every day- 7 days a week, or at least until your sleep 
pattern settles down.
4. Put the light out when you get into bed.
5. Let yourself relax and tell yourself that "sleep will come when it's ready". Enjoy 
relaxing even if you don't at first fall asleep.
6 . Do not try to fall asleep. Sleep is not something you can switch on deliberately but if 
you try to switch it on you can switch it off!
If you have problems getting to sleep
1. Remember that sleep problems are quite common and they are not as damaging as 
you might think. Try not to get upset or frustrated.
2. If you are awake in bed for more than 20 minutes, get up and go into another room.
3. Do something relaxing for a while and don't worry about tomorrow. People usually 
cope quite well even after a sleepless night.
4. Go back to bed when you feel "sleepy tired".
5. Remember the tips from the section above and use them again each time you waken
6 . A good sleep pattern may take a number of weeks to establish. Be confident that you 
will achieve this in the end by working through the "GOOD SLEEP GUIDE".
up.
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